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xABSTRACT
Cloud Computing represents a new trend in modern computing. Since computation
can be purchased as a service, companies and individual users can cut down their com-
puting assets and outsource any burdensome computational workload. In addition to
savings in computing infrastructure, the Cloud may also provide expert technical con-
sulting. But while outsourcing computation provides appealing benefits, one must fully
consider a critical security issue: there is no guarantee on the correctness of the results.
That is, the Cloud servers should be considered error-prone and may or may not be fully
trustworthy. Thus an immediate need for result assurance naturally arises. This need
motivates a growing body of research on verification of outsourced computation. Re-
searchers strive for verifying the result of general computation, not limited to a specific
computational task. Extending classical proof systems, interactive proof (IP) systems
and probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) systems provide basic theoretical models and
meaningful tools for applications. Unfortunately, PCPs and hence arguments are wildly
impractical: traditional PCPs are too expensive to instantiate at the prover or query
from the verifier. While state-of-the-art PCP schemes are asymptotically efficient, the
constants on their running times are large, and they seem too intricate to be implemented
easily.
This dissertation focuses on the verifiable computation, taking steps towards bring-
ing it closer to practicality. We argue that since the verification may be tedious and
expensive, users are likely to outsource (again) the verification workload to a third party.
Other scenarios such as auditing and arbitrating may also require the use of third-party
verification. Outsourcing verification will introduce new security challenges. One such
xi
challenge is to protect the computational task and the results from the untrusted third
party verifier. In this work, we address this problem by proposing an efficient verifica-
tion outsourcing scheme. To our knowledge, this is the first solution to the verification
outsourcing problem. We show that, without using expensive fully-homomorphic en-
cryption, an honest-but-curious third party can help to verify the result of an outsourced
computational task without having to learn either the computational task or the result
thereof. We have implemented our design by combining a novel commitment proto-
col and an additive-homomorphic encryption in the argument system model. The total
cost of the verification in our design is less than the verifiers cost in the state-of-the-art
argument systems that rely only on standard cryptographic assumptions.
Besides the introduction of the verification outsourcing paradigm, we also bring im-
provements to the state-of-the-art verification protocol designs. We firstly investigate
the linearity tests, which overwhelmingly occupy the bandwidth of the interaction part
of the state-of-the-art designs based on linear PCP. Our results show that under certain
assumptions, if this Single- Commit-Multi-Decommit protocol further combines with
the linear PCP, the linearity tests in the combined linear PCP become redundant. Our
theoretical result immediately results in RIVER, a new linear-PCP-based argument sys-
tem which achieves lower cost. Then, we focus on the computations with repeated
sub-structures and design a novel verification protocol, that takes advantage of these
particular features. We notice the state of the art involve a considerable cost, includ-
ing the verifiers amortized cost, (i.e., the cost that needs to be amortized over a large
number of work instances), and the provers cost of proof generation. The most efficient
argument systems still incur an amortized cost that is linear in the size of the circuit.
We address reducing this cost for those outsourced computations which contain repeated
substructures (e.g. loops). Since loops play a pivotal role in the real world of computing
(not only compute-intensive computations but also data-intensive computations such as
big data applications), we take loops as a typical example, propose the first verification
xii
protocol that is specific for computations with repeated structures and show that the
circuit generated from computation with loops can indeed lead to a lower amortized cost
and a lower cost of proof generation. Using the theory of arithmetic circuit complexity
we prove that for most programs our design results in very significant savings.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The surging popularity of the cloud computing paradigm has rendered a new type of
service: computation as a commodity. While using this service, companies and individual
users must no longer maintain expensive computing assets. They just outsource any
burdensome computational workload to the cloud and enjoy additional perks, like expert
technical consulting. But while outsourcing computation provides appealing benefits, one
must fully consider a critical security issue: there is no guarantee on the correctness of
the results returned by the cloud server, which may be error-prone or otherwise not
entirely trustworthy. Thus an immediate need for result assurance naturally arises.
This need motivates a growing body of research on verifiable computation, and in par-
ticular, works focused on verification protocols for general-purpose computation. Since
verifying the result of general computation can be abstracted to classical problems in the
theory of computation, such as interactive proof (IP) systems [1] and probabilistically
checkable proof (PCP) systems [2, 3], the security community naturally turned to the
model of these classical proof systems, attempting to refine theory toward implementa-
tion. In their designs, the server plays the role of a prover trying to convince the client,
who plays the role of a verifier, that the result is correct. A recent line of work strives
for verifying computation based on argument systems [4, 5, 6], a notable variant of the
PCP model. They hold a more practical assumption that, in addition to the verifier
being polynomial-time probabilistic, the prover is also computationally bounded. Break-
throughs [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] in argument systems have made PCP-based approaches
more practical. Another important line of work [13, 10, 14, 15] makes attempts to adopt
2the recent finding of a new characterization of the NP complexity class – the Quadratic
Span Programs (QSPs) (and Quadratic Arithmetic Programs (QAPs)) [13]. Based on
theoretical innovations of QAP [13], a nearly practical verifiable computation system
called Pinocchio was introduced in [14].
The ultimate goal of all these methods is to ensure that the amount of verification
workload performed by the client is less than the workload of performing the same
computation from scratch. Although recent solutions show encouraging results, making
verification closer to practicality than ever, the workload of verification remains quite
expensive, especially for those cases requiring large-scale verification (such as when large
amounts of computation need to be outsourced, and then the results verified). But the
average users may not be willing to spend their valuable time and resources on verification
work, even though this new computational task is much less demanding than the original
one, and neglect verification altogether. We can hardly imagine a hand-held device user
devote CPU time and wireless bandwidth to verification.
To achieve practical verifiable computation, one direct idea is to strive for efficient
verification protocols, taking steps to pursue more practical argument systems. While
part of the work of this dissertation follows this idea, we also propose another idea
towards practical verifiable computation: verification outsoucing.
1.1 Verification for Repeated Structures
Although encouraging results have been emerging, the high costs still stymie their
practicality. In particular, the biggest performance concerns are around further reducing
the amortized cost of verification, and reducing the cost of proof generation. Zaatar [10]
and Pinocchio [14] are two representatives of the state of the art in verifiable computation.
The verification protocols in both Zaatar and Pinocchio can be viewed as argument
systems with amortizing, namely, proof systems that require a high cost for the verifier
3that needs to be amortized over a large number of work instances. In Pinocchio, the
verifier needs to publish a public key and hold a matching verification key. Both the cost
of constructing this verification key and the public key are amortized over all possible
work instances of the same circuit. In Zaatar, the verifier must invest in the expensive
construction of the commitment and all the PCP queries before he performs the actual
verification operations for each instance. This amortized cost grows linearly with the
circuit size in both Zaatar and Pinocchio, and it can be prohibitive, especially for large
circuits, which are widely used in many practical scenarios. Meanwhile, the costs of
proof generation in Zaatar and Pinocchio grow at least linearly with the circuit size.
Assuming the circuit size of the computation task is S, then the cost of proof generation
in Zaatar is asymptotically O(S · log2(S)) and the cost of proof generation in Pinocchio
is asymptotically O(S).
From a theoretical perspective, one natural question is whether it is possible to have
sub-linear time (in the size of the circuit) amortized cost and cost of proof generation. To
the best of our knowledge, this remains an open question. From a practical perspective,
the first requirement is to further reduce both amortized cost and cost of proof generation,
which act as chief obstacles in verifiable computation.
To tackle these problems, instead of merely focusing on optimizing current verification
algorithms regardless of the structure of the computation tasks, like in most recent works,
in this dissertation we take into account the structure of the circuit based on which the
computation tasks are verified.
We observe that repeated structures play a pivotal role in the arithmetic circuit based
on which verification protocol is performed. The compilers of Zaatar and Pinocchio
analyze any high-level program piece by piece and generate the corresponding circuit in
a straightforward way: for instance, loops are unrolled in a naive way. We notice that
almost every computation (e.g. Big Data!) employs loops. Moreover, these computations
are the most likely tasks to be outsourced to the cloud server. Repeated structures show
4up frequently in the circuit generated by Zaatar’s and Pinocchio’s compilers. Meanwhile,
vnTinyRAM universally transforms any C program with fixed number of execution steps
into one single arithmetic circuit, which also contains lots of repeated subcircuits such
as Cmem, Cexe and the multiplexers in the Waksman networks [16].
Repeated structures (e.g. looping structures) are not well addressed in the current
research on verification protocols. As observed in [9, 12], looping can not be handled
concisely. Hence, if we can take advantage of repeated structures in the circuits of these
computations and handle the verification better, we could make verifiable computation
more efficient.
Since we use terminology of loop extensively in this dissertation, we formalize it here.
In this dissertation, the loop body is the piece of code describing the executions inside
the loop. One loop iteration refers to one execution of the loop body.
In this dissertation, we address the problems proposed above, argue that verifiable
computation can be made cheaper by taking advantage of computations whose circuits
contain repeated substructures (e.g. loops), and achieve cheaper verifiable computation
through efficient loop-handling.
1.2 Linear Arguments without Linear Tests
In the line of linear-PCP fashion verifiable computation designs, once the prover
is committed to a proof, the verifier has to perform laborious linearity tests to ensure
the proof is linear. In fact, the number of queries required to perform linearity tests
dominate the number of overall queries of the protocol. Thus, the cost caused by linearity
test is still one of the bottlenecks of current protocols. Up to now, in the context of
Single-Commit-Multi-Decommit protocol, whether the linearity tests are necessary was
still an open question. In this section, we propose our theoretical result, showing that
under a particular assumption, the Single-Commit-Multi-Decommit protocol will provide
5inherent linearity testing. (Specifically, we assume that the commitment information
that the prover holds is computed by a linear function.) Thus, if linear PCP is combined
with this commitment protocol, the linearity tests are obsolete. We will adopt these
theoretical results in our verification protocol design and thus achieve cost savings.
1.3 Verification Outsourcing
In the spirit of outsourcing computation, a natural idea is to also outsource the
verification. For this purpose, the client may delegate the verification to a third party –
the verifier. The verifier does not need to be as powerful as the server doing the original
computation. In the pay-per-use paradigm, the client should pay the verifier far less
than the prover.
In addition to this novel verification-outsourcing paradigm, third-party verification
may benefit other, equally-important applications. For example, disputes between the
server and the client can be solved by an arbitrator who plays the role of the third-
party verifier. Similar verifications may be required by government agencies, nonprofit
organizations, and consumer safety organization, for the purpose of quality evaluation,
project management, etc.
However, outsourcing verification is not trivial to implement. Several challenges
emerge when outsourcing verification to untrusted verifiers. One of these, and the main
focus of this dissertation, is the confidentiality concern. The results of computing are
often confidential. Moreover, in many instances, even the details of the computation
task itself may constitute sensitive material.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no feasible solution to these challenges. The
two-party verification schemes cannot be directly adopted, either. Recomputing requires
the verifier to have the same resources as the prover. If the prover provides a traditional
NP-proof, the verifier is able to verify the result with fewer resources than required to
6recompute. But he still needs to read the entire proof, which costs polynomial time in
the size of the computational task. Apart from the high cost, recomputing or checking
NP-proofs provides little defence against curious verifiers.
In IP-based or PCP-based two-party verification schemes, it is necessary for the
verifier to have perfect knowledge of the computation task and the result (in the context
of computational complexity, the verifier needs to know the instance of the problem).
If the third party simply runs the verifier’s algorithms according to these two-party
designs, the computation task and the result cannot be protected unless an expensive
fully-homomorphic encryption system (e.g. [17]) is deployed.
The challenge here is how a third party can verify the correctness of the result with-
out knowing the computation task and the result and without using expensive fully-
homomorphic encryption [17]. In this dissertation, we describe a secure third-party
confidentiality-preserving verification scheme.
Our work is related to, but different from delegation of computation to two or more
servers [18] [19] [20] [21], where multiple servers with the same computational power
compute individually and compete to convince the client to accept their results. In our
design, without performing the same computation as the prover, the third party only
needs fewer resources to verify the result from the prover.
1.4 Research Scope
In the context of verifiable computation, there are two stages: one in which the out-
souced computation task, which is a piece of code written in the form of a high-level
language (e.g. C), is transformed into an arithmetic circuit, and another in which the
actual verification protocol is performed to check that the prover correctly evaluated
the circuit generated in the first stage. The core of the first transformation stage is
a specific compiler, also known as a circuit generator. State-of-the-art compilers in-
7cludes vnTinyRAM [15, 16] and the compilers in Zaatar and Pinocchio. These compiler
techniques are beyond the scope of this dissertation, and we review these compilers for
completeness in Chapter 2. In this dissertation, we are interested in the second stage,
namely, the actual verification protocol. In the rest of the dissertation, we assume that
the underlying circuit representation has been generated using the aforementioned circuit
generators.
1.5 Innovative Claims
Our work is framed in the context of recent results from delegation of computation.
Our research will investigate completely novel paradigms, and has the potential to gen-
erate an abundance of related research. Our main innovative contributions are broadly
categorized below.
1. Our results show that computation involving loop structures can indeed lead to a
lower set-up cost namely, a set-up cost which is linear in the degree of the loop
body (i.e., the degree of the polynomial that describes the loop body), instead of
its size (i.e., the number of multiplication gates in the circuit description of the
loop body). For most programs, this results in very significant savings.
2. We investigate the linearity tests, which overwhelmingly occupy the communica-
tion of the total cost of the state-of-the-art designs based on linear PCP. Our results
show that under certain assumptions, if this Single-Commit-Multi-Decommit pro-
tocol further combines with the linear PCP, the linearity tests in the combined
linear PCP are redundant. Our theoretical result immediately results in RIVER,
a new linear-PCP-based argument system which achieves lower cost.
3. Our research shows, for the first time, that verification can be outsourced to an un-
trusted third-party, who can verify the correctness of the result without knowing the
8computation task and the result and without using expensive fully-homomorphic
encryption [17].
4. We propose to investigate a new paradigm: secure delegation of computation with
verification outsourcing. At the time of this research, we are not aware of any
results on “delegation of verification”. In fact, we are the first to ever discuss the
idea of multiple outsourcing in the context of delegation of computation.
9CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
Extensive research has been motivated by the problem of verifying computation,
However, much of the prior work focuses on specific problems and exploits properties of
these problems for efficient verification. [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50].
Meanwhile, more work strives for verifying the result of general computation. Verifying
the result of general computation can be viewed as originating from similar but more
abstract problems in the theory of computation, such as interactive proof (IP) systems
[1] and probabilistically checkable proof (PCP) systems [2, 3]. Early results [23, 2, 3, 19,
25, 25, 5, 6, 26] were viewed as important findings only in theoretical computer science.
The current focus is on the efficiency [27, 28], length [27, 29, 30, 31] and soundness error
[32, 33, 34, 35] of PCPs. Until recently, the security community has been extending and
refining classical proof systems, attempting to make theoretical cryptographic protocols
practical.
Extending provides basic theoretical models and meaningful tools for applications.
Existing verifiable computation schemes fall into three broad categories. The first line
of verifiable computation systems [8, 9, 10] is based on the IKO argument system which
is first proposed by Ishai et al. [7]. In these systems, the proof for the result correctness
is formulated into a linear PCP with a commitment which is constructed in the pre-
processing phase. This line of work made PCP-based approaches more practical– very
efficient if batching over a large number of computation instances, while requiring only
standard cryptographic assumptions.
Parno et al. start another line of work [10, 14, 15] which is based on the recent finding
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of a new characterization of the NP complexity class –QSPs/QAPs [13], such as Pinoc-
chio, which supports public verifiability and zero-knowledge. Similarly, by compiling
programs to an innovative circuit representation [51], Ben-Sasson et al. provides another
publicly verifiable and zero-knowledge scheme BCGTV [15, 16]. Our work inherits the
property of the linear-PCP style designs and does not provide zero-knowledge, either.
Motivated by the delegation of computation (GKR [52]), IP systems provides the
third line of work to assure the client that an untrusted prover has actually performed
the correct computation (CRR [21], CMT [53]). In this line of work, Thaler also finds that
circuits that satisfy a specific condition can have much lower cost on the pre-processing
stage [54]. However, their circuits need to satisfy either a so-called “regular” wiring pat-
tern condition or the “data-parallel” structure requirement (namely, a sub-computation
is applied independently to different pieces of data). Besides, Thaler’s work still has
verifier’s cost linear in the size of the circuit. All GKR-style systems typically require
far more interaction, introducing much more bandwidth costs.
As an interesting hybrid-architecture protocol, Allspice [12] integrates both Zaatar
and CMT in such a way that it automatically determines which one would be more
efficient to verify the computation and runs the better of the two. Another study [55]
has been pursuing argument systems that avoid a pre-processing phase for the verifier.
Those argument systems are based on short PCPs, and existing work on this topic is
still only theoretical.
Since state-of-the-art verification protocols are based on arithmetic circuits, the com-
piler which transforms the outsource task (typically a program written in high level
languages such as C) into a circuit representation plays a very important role in this
area. Zaatar’s and Pinocchio’s compilers map a large class of computations into corre-
sponding arithmetic circuits, using special-purpose encodings. Another line of compilers,
TinyRAM [15] and vnTinyRAM [16], use an innovative technique [51] and compile gen-
eral C programs that have the same number of steps of executions to one same circuit.
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This compiler has better performance for programs consisting of lots of memory ac-
cesses and control flow than Zaatar’s and Pinocchio’s, while the compilers of Zaatar and
Pinocchio do better in programs which are close to “circuit” forms [16]. Walfish et al.
evaluate these compilers in [56] and claim TinyRAM’s circuit representation is orders of
magnitude larger than the representation in Pinocchio and Zaatar.
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CHAPTER 3. PRELIMINARIES
This is the opening chapter to my thesis which explains in general terms the concepts
and assumptions which will be used in my thesis.
3.1 Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs)
In the PCP model, the verifier, a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm V
can be convinced by a prover P that a string x belongs to a language L in an interactive
way: V has random access to the proof pi which is constructed by P . By querying pi
(accessing the proof and reading several values), V will either accept or reject.
Correctness: If x ∈ L, P can always construct a proof pi such that V will accept that
x ∈ L. We call pi the correct proof for x.
Soundness: If x 6∈ L then for any pi, the probability that V wrongly accepts is less
than a constant . Let L be any language. The PCP theorem [22] [3] [2] [23] [24]
guarantees that, if L ∈ NP , then with only a constant number of queries, V can verify
x ∈ L with negligible error probability (soundness).
Early results of PCP [23] [2] [3] [19] [25] [25] [5] [6] [26] were viewed as important
discoveries only in the theory of computational complexity. Recent research focuses on
the efficiency [27] [28], length [27] [29] [30] [24] [31] or soundness error [32] [33] [34] [35]
of PCPs.
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3.2 Homomorphic Encryption
The commitment protocols of existing efficient argument systems are all based on ho-
momorphic encryption. This homomorphic encryption does not refer to fully-homomorphic
encryption [17]. Only additive homomorphism is used in current argument systems:
that is, the ciphertext of the result of adding two plaintexts can be efficiently com-
puted from the ciphertexts of the two plaintexts. Formally, for any valid ciphertexts
c1 = Enc(pk,m1) and c2 = Enc(pk,m2), there is an efficient algorithm H such that
H(c1, c2) = Enc (pk,m1 + m2), where pk is the public key and m1,m2 are plaintexts.
In general this does not mean Enc(m1 + m2) = Enc(m1) + Enc(m2), and it is generally
not feasible to have this relation without compromising security. In this dissertation, the
underlying homomorphic encryption is assumed to be semantically secure [36].
3.3 Arguments
Arguments [4] are interactive proof systems, consisting of two PPT algorithms: the
prover P and the verifier V . For an NP language L with soundness error (·), an argument
is both complete and sound if it satisfies the following conditions: (a) Completeness: for
any x ∈ L and corresponding NP witness w, the interaction between V(x) and P(x,w)
leads V to accept the proof as true. (b) Soundness: for any x /∈ L, and any efficient
prover P∗, the interaction between V(x) and P∗(x) leads V to accept the proof with
probability less than (|x|).
3.4 Efficient Arguments without Short PCPs
To make argument systems efficient, current implementations rely on PCPs. However,
PCP algorithms assume that the proof is computed by the prover, and fixed before the
interaction with the verifier begins. The same assumption cannot be made in the context
of argument systems. To bridge the gap between arguments and PCPs, an additional
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protocol is required, in which the prover commits to the proof before starting the PCP
protocol with the verifier. Consequently, an argument is generally formed by joining
together two protocols: a PCP and a commitment. Since the commitment protocol
should maintain the efficiency of the argument, it is generally not feasible to require P
to send the entire PCP proof to V due to the length of the proof. Two solutions can
be implemented to overcome this obstacle: (1) make the PCP proof short, and (2) use
cryptographic techniques to enable even shorter commitments to these short proofs. One
of the first efforts in the latter direction is that of [26], which proposed to use a Merkle
hash-tree construction to enable the prover to efficiently commit to the proof. Implicitly,
the security of the protocol is bound to the security of the underlying hash function.
To avoid the need for convoluted short PCP proofs, as well as the uncertain security of
practical hashing primitives, [7] takes a new approach to argument systems: maintain a
large (exponential-size) proof, and base the commitment on (computationally) provably-
secure encryption primitives – public-key primitives.
The protocols of [7] are restricted to linear PCPs ([23], Section6). It is shown how SAT
problems ( Propositional Satisfiability Problems), formulated in the context of a boolean
circuit, can be readily addressed by a simple linear PCP [7]. To form the argument
system, [7] complemented the linear PCP with the notion of commitment with linear
decommitment, which is instantiated with a simple public-key-based protocol. Since our
work is closely related to that of [7], we will provide both the definition of commitment
with linear decommitment, and a brief sketch of its instantiation in this section.
Definition 1. Commitment with Linear Decommitment ([7]) A commitment with linear
decommitment (in the context of argument systems) is a protocol between the prover P
and verifier V – both modeled as interactive PPT algorithms – consisting of a commitment
phase, and a decommitment phase, and aiming to securely commit the prover to a linear
function fd : Fn → F expressed as fd(z) = 〈d, z〉, where d, z ∈ Fn, and 〈d, z〉 is the natural
inner (dot) product over vector spaces. In the commitment phase, an environment E gives
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P inputs d and F, and gives V inputs F and the arity n. The interaction between P and
V results in decommitment information zP and zV , respectively. In the decommitment
phase, E gives P a decommitment query q ∈ Fn. After further interaction between P and
V, the verifier V outputs either a value a ∈ F, or the symbol ⊥ (reject).
A commitment with linear decommitment has the following properties. (a) Correct-
ness: for any n and E generating d, q, at the end of the decommitment phase, the verifier
outputs a = fd(q). (b) Binding: for the same decommitment information zP , zV (obtained
after the commitment phase) and environment inputs q in the decommitment phase, the
probability that at the end of the protocol the verifier outputs two different values (a1, a2)
is negligible in n.
Ishai et al. [7] took L as the satisfiability problem over an arithmetic circuit to
show how to construct a correct proof for any arithmetic circuit and how to verify this
circuit is satisfiable. Since this problem is NP-complete, every other NP problems can
be deterministically and efficiently reduced to it. The PCP theorem guarantees that, if
L ∈ NP then with only constant number of queries, V can verify x ∈ L with negligible
error probability (soundness).
The instance x is an arithmetic circuit in this problem. For x ∈ L, there is a correct
assignment z of the inputs to all gates in x. z can be also viewed as values of both the
input of x and intermediate results. The correct proof is an exponential size PCP, which
consists of two substrings. Each of the substrings can be viewed as a linear function:
pi(1) : Fn 7→ F and pi(2) : Fn2 7→ F where n is the length of a correct assignment z,
pi(1)(·) = 〈z, ·〉 and pi(2)(·) = 〈z ⊗ z, ·〉. Here, 〈u, v〉 denotes the inner product of two
vectors u and v, and u⊗ v denotes the outer product of two vectors u and v. The outer
product is equivalent to a matrix multiplication uvT , provided that u and v are both
represented as a column vector. The whole proof string can be viewed as one single linear
function pi : Fn2+n 7→ F such that pi(·) = 〈z||z ⊗ z, ·〉 where z||z ⊗ z is the concatenation
of the two vectors z and z⊗z. When V sends the query q to pi, he will get back pi(q). For
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Table 3.1 Commitment Protocol of IKO [7]
Prover’s Input: a vector d ∈ Fn2+n,
a linear function pi : Fn2+n → F where pi(q) = 〈q, d〉.
Verifier’s Input: arity n2 + n, a PCP query q,
security parameter k for the homomorphic encryption.
Commitment Phase
Step 1: Verifier generates the key pair (pk, sk)← Gen(1k).
Verifier randomly generates a vector r ∈R Fn2+n,
r = (r1, r2, · · · , rn2+n), ri ∈ F, i ∈ [n2 + n].
Verifier encrypts each entry of the vector r using pk.
He sends to the prover:
Enc(pk, r1), · · · , Enc(pk, rn2+n) and pk.
Step 2: Prover makes use of the homomorphism of Enc
and gets e = Enc(pk, 〈r, d〉). Prover sends e to Verifier.
Step 3: Verifier decrypts e and gets s = 〈r, d〉 = Dec(sk, e).
(s, r) will be kept for future decommitment.
Decommitment Phase
Step 4: Verifier picks at random a secret α ∈R F.
Step 5: Verifier sends q, r + αq to the prover.
Step 6: Prover responds with 2 values that are in F:
(a, b) where a is supposed to be pi(q)
and b is supposed to be pi(r + αq).
Step 7: Verifier will determine whether b = s+ αa.
If it holds, the verifier will accept and output a;
otherwise it will reject and output ⊥.
q ∈ Fn, pi(q) = 〈z||z⊗ z, q||0n2〉 = 〈z, q〉. For q ∈ Fn2 , pi(q) = 〈z||z⊗ z, 0n||q〉 = 〈z⊗ z, q〉.
For q ∈ Fn2+n, pi(q) = 〈z||z ⊗ z, q〉.
As in Table 3.1, the commitment protocol was designed in [7], where a commitment
to a proof is constructed and V can verify that the proof is indeed a linear function.
Once the proof is committed, V will check the proof in the linear PCP fashion. The
verification consists of three kinds of tests. The first is the linearity test. V picks at
random q1, q2 ∈ Fn and verifies pi(q1) + pi(q2) = pi(q1 + q2). The second is the quadratic
consistency test. V picks at random q3, q4 ∈ Fn and verifies pi(q3) ·pi(q4) = pi(q3⊗q4). The
third is the circuit correctness test. Each gate implies a constraint. For each constraint
fu, (u = 1, 2, · · ·n), V picks at random a weight δu and constructs the weighted sum
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∑n
u=1 δufu. The sum can be rewritten as pi(q5) + c = 0, c ∈ F. If each constraint is
satisfied, the weighted sum of the constraints pi(q5) + c = 0 is also satisfied. If there are
some constrains not satisfied, the probability that the pi(q5) + c = 0 is 1/|F|. All these
tests can be performed several times to drive the error probability down.
If we view the proof to be a function, then these commitment protocols ensure that
once the prover commits to a certain function, later the answers to the verifier’s queries
are bounded to this function. However, it is not clear whether this function is linear.
Since the correctness and soundness of all the linear PCP based argument systems–
Pepper [8], Ginger [37], and Zaatar [10]– hold on the assumption that the committed
proof is linear, mandatory tests for linearity have to be performed before genuinely
checking whether the proof assures the correctness of the returned results. In the so-
called linearity tests, the verifier picks at random queries q1 and q2, and verifies pi(q1) +
pi(q2) = pi(q1 + q2), where pi(·) is the committed function. It is pretty clear that if
pi(·) is linear, the equation must hold; if pi(·) is not linear (viewed as being δ-close to a
linear function) , the verifier will miss the non-linear part of pi(·) with only a certain error
probability. This test can be performed several times to drive the error probability down.
A typical usage of linearity tests can be found in the first and the fourth steps of Zaatar
as shown in Table 3.1, where V queries P with q5, q6, q7 where q7 = q5 + q6, and q8, q9, q10
where q10 = q8 + q9, expecting that the following holds: piW (q7) = piW (q6) + piW (q5) and
piW (q10) = piW (q9) + piW (q8).
To make the test “smooth”, a mechanism of self-correction is needed. It is the mech-
anism of self-correction that, conditioned on a proof being δ-close to a linear function,
allows the calculation of the soundness for the argument systems. The mechanism is,
when querying pi(·) with query q, the verifier actually queries with q0 and q0 + q instead
of a single query q, and pi(q) is computed from pi(q0 + q) − pi(q0). It is easy to see that
the querying process in Zaatar uses the mechanism of self-correction. For instance, in
order to get piW (qA), the verifier queries the prover with q5 and q1 = qA + q5 instead of
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qA.
3.5 Two Recent Efficient Arguments: PEPPER and GINGER
Several recent works build upon the ideas developed in [7]. Of these, [8] and [9] are the
most relevant to our work. To bring the protocol of [7] closer to practicality, [8] introduces
a new protocol called PEPPER. It first shows that large savings in both computation
and communication overhead can be achieved by expressing the SAT problem in the
format of arithmetic circuits with concise gates [8] instead of the boolean circuits of [7].
In addition, by batching together multiple queries (to the same committed function),
[8] can decommit all of them in a single commit-decommit round, rather than providing
separate decommitments for each query.
In Ishai et al.’s original commitment design [7], one query is accompanied by an
auxiliary query which is associated to a commitment. This requires many commitments,
therefore increases the overhead. In [8], one auxiliary query is made, which is a random
linear combination of all the PCP queries and the secret information that is associated
to the commitment. In this design, one decommitment can guarantee many PCP queries
are bound to the committed function. This sharply reduced the computational cost of
generating the commitment information (although remaining cost is still very high.).
The Single-Commit-Multi-Decommit design is demonstrated in Table 3.2.
Finally, by batching together multiple computations, [8] only requires a single random
commitment query r for all computations involved (rather than a different r for each
computation), hence achieving great savings in the encryption process – recall that the
query r is transmitted to the prover after it has been encrypted by the homomorphic
encryption algorithm.
Building on top of [8], additional improvements are provided in [9], in the context of
a more efficient protocol called GINGER. For example, several queries of the quadratic
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Table 3.2 The Single-Commit-Multi-Decommit Design [9]
P’s Input: a vector z ∈ Fn, a linear function pi : Fn2+n 7→ F
where pi(·) = 〈Z||z ⊗ z, ·〉, n is the length of a correct assignment z.
V’s Input: arity n, security parameter k of the encryption.
Commitment
Step 1: V generates the key pair: (pk, sk)← Gen(1k).
V randomly generates a vector: r = (r1, r2, · · · , rn2+n) ∈R Fn2+n.
ri ∈ F, i = 1, 2, · · · , n2 + n. V encrypts each entry of the vector r.
He sends Enc(pk, r1), · · · , Enc(pk, rn2+n) to P .
Step 2: Using the homomorphism,
P gets: e = Enc(pk, 〈r, z〉) P sends e to V .
Step 3: V decrypts e. He gets s = 〈r, z〉 = Dec(sk, e).
Decommitment
Step 1: V picks µ secrets α1, · · · , αµ ∈ F
V queries P with q1, · · · , qµ and t = r + α1q1 + · · ·+ αµqµ.
Step 2: P returns (a1, · · · , aµ, b)
where ai = pi(qi) for i = 1, · · · , µ and b = pi(t)
Step 3: V checks whether b = s+ α1a1 + · · ·αµaµ holds.
If so, V outputs a1, · · · , aµ.
Otherwise, he rejects and output ⊥.
correction test may be omitted [9] from the V-to-P transmission, as they can be easily
computed by the prover from the remaining quadratic correction queries.
Definition 2. A commitment to a function with multiple decommitments (CFMD)(from
[8]) A commitment to a function with multiple decommitments (CFMD) is defined by a
pair of PPT algorithms (P ,V) (a sender and receiver, which correspond to our prover
and verifier) anticipating the following experiment with an environment E. E generates
F, w and Q = (q1, · · · , qµ). The two phases are:
• Commitment phase: P has w, and P and V interact, based on their random inputs.
• Decommitment phase: E gives Q to V, and P and V interact again, based on
further random inputs. At the end, V outputs A = (a1, · · · , aµ) ∈ Fµ or ⊥.
A commitment to a function with multiple decommitments (CFMD) should satisfy
the following properties:
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• Correctness: at the end of the decommitment phase, V outputs pi(qi) = 〈w, qi〉 ,
(for all i), if P is honest.
• B-Binding:. Consider the following experiment. The environment E produces
two (possibly distinct) µ-tuples of queries: Q = (q1, · · · , qµ) and Qˆ = (qˆ1, · · · , qˆµ).
V and a cheating P∗ run the commitment phase once and two independent instances
of the decommitment phase. In the two instances V presents the queries as Q and
Qˆ, respectively. We say that P∗ wins if V’s outputs at the end of the respective
decommit phases are A = (a1, · · · , aµ) and Aˆ = (aˆ1, · · · , aˆµ), and for some i, j, we
have qi = qˆj but ai 6= aˆj. The protocol holds the B-Binding property if for all E
and for all efficient P∗, the probability of P∗ winning is at most B. The probability
is taken over three sets of independent randomness: the commitment phase and the
two runnings of the decommitment phase.
3.6 Quadratic Programs
Recently Gennaro, Gentry, Parno and Raykova introduced a new characterization of
the NP complexity class – the Quadratic Span Programs (QSPs) (and Quadratic Arith-
metic Programs (QAPs)) [13, 14]. They showed that NP can be defined as the set of
languages with proofs that can be efficiently verified by QSPs (or QAPs). Similarly to
PCPs – another characterization of NP, which has already been widely used to obtain
verifiable computation schemes – QSPs/QAPs are considered to be well-suited for ver-
ifiable computation and zero-knowledge schemes. One limitation of QSPs is that they
inherently compute boolean circuits. But since arithmetic circuits are more natural and
efficient in real-world computation tasks, we focus on QAPs, the counterpart of QSPs
dealing with arithmetic circuit evaluation.
Definition 1. (Quadratic Arithmetic Programs [13]) A QAP Q over field F contains
3 sets of W ′ + 1 polynomials: {Aw(t)}, {Bw(t)}, {Cw(t)}, for w ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,W ′}, and
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a target polynomial D(t). For function Ψ : FN 7→ FN ′, we say Q computes Ψ if the
following holds: (z1, · · · , zN+N ′) ∈ FN+N ′ is a valid assignment of Ψ’s inputs and outputs,
iff there exist coefficients zN+N ′+1, · · · , zW ′ such that D(t) divides P (t), where P (t) =(∑W ′
w=1 zw · Aw(t) + A0(t)
)
·
(∑W ′
w=1 zw · Bw(t) + B0(t)
)
−
(∑W ′
w=1 zw · Cw(t) + C0(t)
)
.
Namely, there exists a polynomial H(t) such that D(t) ·H(t) = P (t).
Given an arithmetic circuit computing function Ψ, its corresponding QAP can be
constructed by polynomial interpolation. Consider the set of circuit wires corresponding
to the inputs and outputs of the circuit, and also the outputs of all multiplication gates.
Each one of these wires is assigned three interpolation polynomials in Lagrange form,
encoding whether the wire is a left input, right input, or output of each multiplication
gate [13, 14]. The resulting set of polynomials is a complete description of the original
circuit.
3.7 A Recent Efficient Argument System: Zaatar
The very recent work of [38] observes that QAPs can also be viewed as linear PCPs.
By re-designing the PCP query generation and replacing the quadratic consistency checks
and circuit correctness checks with the divisibility check of a QAP, Setty et al. suc-
cessfully fit QAPs into the framework of Ginger [9]. The result is the novel proto-
col Zaatar, which significantly reduces the prover’s workload. The key observation of
Zaatar is that the evaluation of the polynomial P (t) at the point t = τ can be sim-
ply written as: P (τ) = (〈Z, q〉 + A0(τ)) · (〈Z, q′〉 + B0(τ)) − (〈Z, q′′〉 + C0(τ)), where
Z = (z1, z2, · · · , zW ′), q = (A1(τ), A2(τ), · · · , AW ′(τ)), q′ = (B1(τ), B2(τ), · · · , BW ′(τ)),
and q′′ = (C1(τ), · · · , CW ′(τ)). Thus, P (τ) can be evaluated through three standard
PCP queries to the dot product oracle piZ(·) = 〈Z, ·〉. If we represent the polynomi-
als H(t) explicitly: H(t) = h|CZ |t
|CZ | + · · · + h1t + h0 (where CZ is the set of con-
straints in Zaatar), similar observations on H(τ) can be made: H(τ) = 〈KH , qH〉 where
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V queries an oracle piR(·) = 〈R, ·〉, where R = (zN+N′+1, · · · , zW ′ ) is the intermediate results of the circuit compu-
tation.
–loop ρ times from 0 to 4:
0. Linearity queries generation. V selects q5, q6 ∈ FW ′−(N+N′) and q8, q9 ∈ F|CZ |+1. He takes q7 ←
q5 + q6 and q10 ← q8 + q9. Perform ρlin iterations in total.
1. QAP queries generation. V selects τ ∈ F and takes qH ← (1, τ, τ2, · · · , τ |CZ |), and q4 ← qH + q8 and:
• qA ← (A(W ′)(τ), A(W ′−1)(τ), · · · , A(N+N′+1)(τ)), and q1 ← (qa + q5).
• qB ← (B(W ′)(τ), B(W ′−1)(τ), · · · , B(N+N′+1)(τ)), and q2 ← (qb + q5).
• qC ← (C(W ′)(τ), C(W ′−1)(τ), · · · , C(N+N′+1)(τ)), and q3 ← (qc + q5).
2. Querying piR. V sends out q1, q2, · · · , q4+6ρ and gets back piR(q1), piR(q2), · · · , piR(q4+6ρ).
3. Linearity tests. Check whether following holds: piR(q7) = piR(q6) + piR(q5), piR(q10) = piR(q9) + piR(q8)
and likewise for all other ρ− 1 iterations. If not, reject.
4. Divisibility test. V takes: Aτ = (piR(q1) − piR(q5) +
PN+N′
w=1 zw · Aw(τ) + A0(τ)), Bτ = (piR(q2) −
piR(q5) +
PN+N′
w=1 zw ·Bw(τ) +B0(τ)), Cτ = (piR(q3)− piR(q5) +
PN+N′
w=1 zw ·Cw(τ) +C0(τ)), and V checks
whether the following equation holds: D(τ) · (piH(q4)− piH(q8)) = Aτ ·Bτ − Cτ . If not, reject.
–If V makes it here, accept.
Figure 3.1 Zaatar’s linear PCP based on QAPs
KH = (h0, h1, · · · , h|CZ |) and qH = (1, τ, τ 2, · · · , τ |CZ |). Thus, H(τ) can also be evalu-
ated through one PCP query to the oracle piH(·) = 〈KH , ·〉. If Z consists of the input
X with width |X| = N , output Y with width |Y | = N ′ and intermediate results R with
|R| = W ′ − (N +N ′), then in order to guarantee that Y is the correct output when the
input is X, the verifier needs to compute a part of 〈Z, q〉, and also a part of 〈Z, q′〉 and
〈Z, q′′〉, by himself. Consequently, V only queries the linear function oracle piR(·) = 〈R, ·〉,
instead of piZ(·). The detailed design (for one execution) of Zaatar is given in Figure
3.11.
1Note that the commitment/decommitment part is omitted for simplicity in Figure 3.1. Zaatar
inherits the single-commit-multi-decommit protocol from Ginger [9].
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CHAPTER 4. DELEGATION OF COMPUTATION WITH
VERIFICATION OUTSOURCING: CURIOUS VERIFIERS
4.1 Problem Statement
4.1.1 System Model
In the context of cloud computing, we propose a computation architecture involving
three different parties: the client C, who is computationally weak, has computation
tasks to be delegated to the cloud; the cloud server P , who is computationally powerful,
provides computing services to the client; the verifier V , who is not required to be
computationally powerful, provides verification services, helping C to check the results
computed by P . P also plays the role of the prover that attempts to convince C (through
V) that the result is correct.
The computation tasks are formalized into the arithmetic circuit satisfiability problem
– i.e., the Circuit-SAT problem over an arithmetic circuit. This problem is NP-complete,
hence any other NP problem can be deterministically and efficiently reduced to it. The
reason we choose this arithmetic circuit version instead of the original Boolean Circuit-
SAT is that most real-world computation tasks can be easily mapped to arithmetic
circuits. Let x be a single-output, n-gate arithmetic circuit (n includes the input gates
and the output gate). In the language of computational complexity, we can consider x
as an instance of the arithmetic circuit satisfiability problem. Formally, x ∈ L where L
is the language of the arithmetic circuit satisfiability problem. If x is satisfiable for a
given output value E ∈ F, then there exists an input y of length |y| = m to the circuit
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x, which results in the circuit outputting E. This translates into a correct assignment
z of the set of the outputs of all the gates in x. The assignment z can be in fact the
concatenation of the input y with all the intermediate results inside the circuit, and has
length |z| = n.
C is providing P with an output E ∈ F, and expects P to return the input y which
makes the circuit output E.
4.1.2 Threat Model
The threats faced by a client in our outsourced verification scenario come from ma-
licious behaviors of both the prover P and the verifier V . We assume P and V do not
collude. This assumption is commonly used in multi-prover scenarios [18] [19] [20] [21].
Similar to previous proof systems, P can provide wrong responses to any queries, trying
to cheat C. In this chapter, we only address the problem caused by an “honest-but-
curious” V – one that is interested in learning the computation task and/or the result,
but performs the protocol faithfully. Different attack models such as dishonest V will be
addressed in future work.
We need to point out that in all of our schemes we omit the authentication part,
since authentication is a mature technology and it is not within the scope of our work.
In our context, we assume that all parties are appropriately authenticated.
4.1.3 Design Goals
First of all, our proposed scheme should provide defense against the curious veri-
fier V under the aforementioned model. To enable correct and efficient outsourcing of
verification, the proposed scheme should satisfy the following requirements:
• Correctness: If y is the correct result, P can always construct a proof and convince
the client C and the verifier V of the correctness of y.
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• Soundness: If y is not the correct result, then for any proofs provided by a malicious
P∗, the probability that V wrongly accepts is negligibly small.
• Efficiency: The overall workload for the client C should be less – in an amortized
sense (we will detail it later in Section 4.4) – than performing the verification him-
self. The workload for the verifier V should be comparable to that for verification
in current two-parties designs [7, 8, 9]. Naturally, the workload for V should be far
less than recomputing the result from scratch.
4.2 Basic Scheme: Verification Without Circuit Information
We present a basic version of our protocol in this section. We then bootstrap the
process to develop the full solution in next section. In this basic scheme, the client
C delegates the verification task to the verifier V and V can verify the proof without
knowing the computational task, i.e., the underlying arithmetic circuit x. Our basic
scheme is designed by joining together two protocols: a novel linear PCP and a new
commitment protocol. Recall that PCP systems assume the proof is computed by P ,
and fixed before the interaction with the V begins. The same assumption cannot be
made in Cloud Computing. For efficiency reasons, it is also not feasible to require P
to send the entire PCP proof to V . It is the commitment protocol that guarantees P
commits to the proof before starting the PCP protocol with V .
4.2.1 A Building Block: A New Commitment Protocol
In the context of Circuit-SAT problem over an arithmetic circuit, we propose the
following new commitment protocol for linear PCP system. It is a two-party protocol
between the prover P and another party denoted by C/V (as in “client/verifier”). We
do not differentiate between the client C and the verifier V in this subsection. This
separation will be done in next subsection. Recall that the Circuit-SAT problem is to
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Table 4.1 Comparison of Commitment Protocols
Ishai et al. [7] GINGER [9] Our Basic Commitment Scheme
Commitment Phase Commitment Phase Commitment Phase
Prover’s Input: a vector d ∈
Fn
2+n, a linear function pi :
Fn
2+n → F where pi(q) =
〈q, d〉.
Prover’s Input: z ∈ Fn, a lin-
ear function pi : Fn
2+n 7→ F
where pi(·) = 〈z||z ⊗ z, ·〉.
Prover’s Input: a vector z ∈ Fn, a linear function
pi : Fn
2+n 7→ F where pi(·) = 〈z||z ⊗ z, ·〉, n is the
length of a correct assignment z.
Verifier’s Input: arity n2 +
n, security parameter k for the
homomorphic encryption.
Verifier’s Input: arity n, se-
curity parameter k of the en-
cryption.
Verifier’s Input: arity n, security parameter k of
the encryption, the circuit x, the circuit’s input y =
(y1, · · · , ym) and output E.
Step 1: V generates the key
pair (pk, sk) ← Gen(1k) and
r = (r1, · · · , rn2+n) ∈R
Fn
2+n, ri ∈ F, i =
1, · · · , n2 + n. V encrypts
each entry of r and sends
Enc(pk, r1), · · · , Enc(pk, rn2+n)
to P.
Step 1: V generates the key
pair (pk, sk) ← Gen(1k) and
r = (r1, · · · , rn2+n) ∈R
Fn
2+n. ri ∈ F,
i = 1, · · · , n2 + n. V encrypts
each entry of r and sends
Enc(pk, r1), · · · , Enc(pk, rn2+n)
to P.
Step 1: C/V randomly picks r0 ∈ Fn and R0 ∈
Fn
2
and constructs the corresponding commitments
(s0, S0) according to Ishai et al.’s commitment pro-
tocol [7].
Step 2: P makes use of the
homomorphism of Enc and gets
e = Enc(pk, 〈r, d〉). P sends e
to V.
Step 2: Using the homo-
morphism, P gets: e =
Enc(pk, 〈r, z〉) and sends it to
V.
Step 2: C/V randomly generates an n-dimension
weight vector w0 = (w01, w02, . . . , w0n) ∈ Fn,
where each entry corresponds to a constraint fu
(u = 1, · · · , n) of the arithmetic circuit x. C/V
multiplies each constraint fu of the circuit by w0u,
u = 1, · · · , n and constructs their summation as
nP
u=1
w0ufu =
mP
u=1
w0uyu + w0nE. The summation
of all these weighted constraints can be rewritten as
〈R1, z ⊗ z〉 + 〈r1, z〉 = c0, where c0 =
mP
u=1
yuw0u +
w0nE.
Step 3: V decrypts e and gets
s = 〈r, d〉 = Dec(sk, e). (s, r)
will be kept for decommitment.
Step 3: V receives e. He gets
s = 〈r, z〉 = Dec(sk, e). (s, r)
will be kept for decommitment.
Step 3: Using R1 and r1, C/V constructs the corre-
sponding commitments (s1, S1) according to Ishai’s
commitment protocol [7].
Decommitment Phase Decommitment Phase Decommitment Phase
Prover’s Input: d, pi Prover’s Input: z, pi, n Prover’s Input: x, z including y and E, pi, n.
Verifier’s Input: arity n2+n,
a PCP query q, decommitment
information (r, s).
Verifier’s Input: arity n, µ
PCP queries q1, · · · , qµ, de-
commitment information (r, s).
Verifier’s Input: n, µ PCP queries
q1, · · · , qµ, decommitment information
(w0, r0, R0, r1, R1, s0, S0, s1, S1).
Step 4: V picks at random a
secret α ∈R F.
Step 4: V picks µ secrets
α1, · · · , αµ ∈ F
Step 4: C/V generates randomly an n-dimension
weight vector w1 = (w11, . . . , w1n) ∈ Fn and a secret
α1 ∈ F.
Step 5: V sends q, r + αq to
the prover.
Step 5: V queries P with
q1, · · · , qµ and t = r +
µP
i=1
αiqi.
Step 5: C/V queries P with vector w1 and w2 =
w0 + α1w1.
Step 6: P responds with 2 val-
ues that are in F : (a, b) where
a is supposed to be pi(q) and b
is supposed to be pi(r + αq).
Step 6: P returns µ + 1
values: (a1, · · · , aµ, b) where
ai = pi(qi) for i = 1, · · · , µ
and b = pi(t)
Step 6: From w1, P constructs the weighted summa-
tion of all constraints just like what C/V does in Step
2 and gets 〈Q0, z ⊗ z〉 + 〈q0, z〉 =
Pm
u=1 yuw1u +
w1nE. From it, P learns Q0 and q0 and returns:
A1 = 〈Q0, z ⊗ z〉 and a1 = 〈q0, z〉. Similarly, from
w2, P constructs the weighted summation 〈T1, z ⊗
z〉 + 〈t1, z〉 =
Pm
u=1 yuw2u + w2nE and learns T1
and t1. P returns: B1 = 〈T1, z⊗z〉 and b1 = 〈t1, z〉.
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
Comparison of Commitment Protocols
Ishai et al. [7] GINGER [9] Our Basic Commitment Scheme
Step 7: V will determine
whether b = s+αa. If it holds,
the V will accept and output a;
otherwise it will reject and out-
put ⊥.
Step 7: V checks whether b =
s+α1a1+· · ·αµaµ holds. If so,
V outputs a1, · · · , aµ. Other-
wise, he rejects and output ⊥.
Step 7: C/V checks whether b1 = s1 + α1a1 and
B1 = S1 + α1A1. If both hold, C/V goes on to Step
8. Otherwise, C/V rejects the proof.
Step 8: C/V randomly generates α0, α1, · · · , αµ
from F. C/V constructs t = (r1||R1) + α0(r0||R0) +Pµ
k=1 αkqk.
Step 9: C/V queries P with q1, · · · , qµ and t.
Step 10: P returns µ + 1 corresponding answers
(a1, · · · , aµ, b2) where for k = 1, 2, · · ·µ, ak =
〈qk, z||z ⊗ z〉 and b2 = 〈t, z||z ⊗ z〉.
Step 11: C/V checks whether b2 = (s1+S1+α0(s0+
S0)) +
Pµ
k=1 αkak holds. If so, C/V accepts. Other-
wise C/V rejects.
find an input y = (y1, y2, · · · , ym) which makes the circuit x output a given value E. The
arithmetic circuit x consists of n = |x| arithmetic gates. Each gate implies a constraint
fu, 1 ≤ u ≤ n as follows:
• fu(zu) = zu for 1 ≤ u ≤ m. These are the constraints for the input gates.
• fu(zi, zj, zk) = 0 for m+1 ≤ u ≤ n−1, where fu is a linear or quadratic polynomial
of zi, zj, zk. Here zi, zj, zk are the two inputs and one output of a certain gate of x.
• fn(zn) = E. This is the constraint for the output gate.
Our commitment protocol rearranges the argument system to put the circuit-dependent
portions inside the commitment phase (the oﬄine stage). This approach not only simpli-
fies the client/verifier’s operation on the verification side, but also provides circuit-secrecy
against the verifiers while outsourcing the verification tasks.
Our commitment protocol is demonstrated in the third column of Table 4.1.3. This
protocol eventually includes two decommitment processes, one is from Step 4 to Step 7,
the other is from Step 8 to Step 11.
We will prove that after the commitment construction phase, all of P ’s answers to
later queries that pass both the decommitment checks are guaranteed to be bound to
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one single function (from queries to answers) with high probability. That is, having com-
mitted, P is very likely incapable of cheating the verifiers with fake answers. Moreover,
this function is guaranteed to be linear with high probability.
Theorem 1. (Main Theorem) For our commitment protocol, the following holds. For
any environment E, for any query q in either of the decommitment phases, the corre-
sponding answer accepted by V at the end of the protocol is guaranteed to be the function
value p˜i(q) except with probability less than 1|F| + neg(n), where p˜i(q) is a fixed function,
neg(n) is a negligible function, and the probability is over all randomness of P∗ and V
in all phases.
We prove this theorem in Section 4.5.
4.2.2 A Delegation-of-Verification Scheme with Partial Circuit Confidential-
ity
As in the context of cloud computing, C sends the circuit description x to P . After
finding out the solution y with his powerful computation ability, P returns y to C. Before
outsourcing the verification task, C constructs the commitment according to our basic
commitment scheme. C plays the role of C/V in that commitment construction protocol
and gets: w0, r1, R1, r0, R0, s1, S1, s0 S0. The decommitment phases are a little bit
different from our basic commitment scheme. C generates a random value α0 ∈ F and
computes (r1||R1) +α0(r0||R0). Then, C outsources the verification task to a third party
V . C sends w0, (r1||R1)+α0(r0||R0), s1, S1, s1+S1+α0(s0+S0), E, and yi’s (i = 1, · · ·m)
to V . Later, V will perform the decommitment.
For the linearity test, the idea is to check whether y(x1), y(x2), y(x1+x2) (the answers
to random queries x1, x2 and corresponding x1 + x2) satisfy y(x1) + y(x2) = y(x1 + x2).
This is detailed in [8],we omit it here.
For the circuit test, V generates w1 and w2 as in Step 4 and Step 5 of our basic
commitment scheme. As in Step 5 and Step 6, V queries P with w1 and w2, receives
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back A1, a1, B1 and b1. Then V checks the equations as in Step 7. V will also check the
circuit correctness, i.e., whether
A1 + a1 =
m∑
u=1
yuw1u + w1nE. (4.2.1)
For the quadratic consistency tests, V first conducts the second decommitment ac-
cording to Steps 8, 9, 10, 11. Here, V uses only three testing queries (that is, µ = 3)
and the decommit query t. V randomly generates queries q2, q3 both from Fn. He ran-
domly generates α2, α3, α4, all from F. He constructs the following queries: q4 = q2⊗ q3,
and t = (r1||R1 + α0(r0||R0)) +
∑3
i=2(qi||0n
2
) + α4(0
n||q4), where 0u is the u-dimension
zero vector. V queries P with (q2, q3, q4, t). P returns (a2, a3, a4, b2) where a2 = 〈q2, z〉,
a3 = 〈q3, z〉, a4 = 〈q4, z ⊗ z〉, b2 = 〈t, z ⊗ z〉. At the second decommitment, V checks
whether b2 = (s1 + S1 + α0(s0 + S0)) +
∑4
i=2 αiai. For quadratic consistency, V checks
whether a4 = a2a3.
If all the checks pass, V will instruct C to accept. Otherwise, V instructs C to reject.
4.2.3 Theoretical Analysis: Correctness and Soundness
It is easy to see that without knowing the circuit x, V conducts all the PCP checks
(except the linearity tests, since the commitment has provided linearity tests already)
for C. The correctness and soundness of this scheme follows directly from the linear
PCP scheme. However, it should be noted that V has access to the pair ((r1||R1) +
α0(r0||R0), s1 + S1 + α0(s0 + S0)), which leaks information about the circuit. Hence the
partial circuit confidentiality is afforded by this scheme. Nevertheless, building upon
this scheme, full circuit confidentiality is achieved by the full solution outlined in the
next section. Our basic scheme is also a distinct improvement over existing argument
systems. During the verification procedure, the verifier does not need to read the circuit.
He can generate all the queries with the cost of merely generating random numbers.
By comparison, to generate a query, current argument systems need to both generate
random numbers, and to calculate weighted summations of all circuit’s constraints.
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4.3 The Full Solution to Delegating Verification to a Curious
Verifier
In certain scenarios, both the computation circuit and input/output of this circuit are
sensitive. A curious verifier may be interested in information regarding the computation
task (the circuit) and/or the circuit’s input and output. In this section, we use the pre-
viously described basic scheme to develop the full solution against the curious verifier.
The full version of the protocol consists of four phases, detailed in the following sub-
sections: outsourcing computation, constructing commitments, outsourcing verification,
and making a decision.
4.3.1 Outsourcing Computation Phase
C possesses an additive homomorphic cryptosystem. He generates a key pair (SK,PK).
C sends the arithmetic circuit description x along with the public key PK to P . After
finding out the solution y with his powerful computation ability, P returns y to C. After
this computation, P obtains a correct assignment z of all the input of each gate in x.
z can be viewed as the values of both y (the input of x) and intermediate results. P
possesses a corresponding linear function: pi : Fn2+n 7→ F (remember n = |x| = |z|) such
that, pi(·) = 〈z||z ⊗ z, ·〉.
4.3.2 Constructing Commitments
Before outsourcing the verification task to a third party, C constructs the commitment
according to the protocol described in Table 4.1.3. At the end of the construction, C
possesses: w0, r1, R1, r0, R0, and s1, S1, s0, S0. C generates a random value α0 ∈ F and
computes (r1||R1) + α0(r0||R0). After constructing the commitment, C randomly picks
w11, w12, · · · , w1m and w1n, all in F. Let w′1 be ((w11, w12, · · · , w1m)||0n−m−1||w1n). With
these numbers, C computes c0 =
∑m
u=1w1uyu + w1nE, then randomly generates α1 and
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sends α1, s1,S1, c0, w0 + α1w
′
1, (r1||R1) + α0(r0||R0), Enc(PK, (s1 + S1 + α0(s0 + S0))),
and the public key PK to V . Meanwhile, C sends w11, · · · , w1m, w1nand PK to P .
4.3.3 Outsourcing Verification Phase
In this phase, V will verify the result without knowing the circuit and any of the
assignments z (including y) in a PCP fashion. Given that the commit/decommit protocol
has inherently provided the linearity test, it is sufficient to conduct only circuit tests and
quadratic consistency tests.
The first step is the circuit satisfiability test. As in Section 4.2, V generates ran-
domly two weight vectors. However, the vectors are a little bit different here: he generates
(w1(m+1), w1(m+2), · · · , w1(n−1)), all from F. Let w′′1 be (0m||(w1(m+1), w1(m+2), · · · , w1(n−1))||0).
He generates w2 as w2 = (w0 +α1w
′
1) +α1w
′′
1 , and queries P with w′′1 and w2. This time,
he will receive back Enc(PK,A1), Enc(PK, a1), Enc(PK,B1), Enc(PK, b1). Using PK,
V computes Enc (PK, (s1 + α1c0)) from s1, α1 and c0. Using the additive homomor-
phism of underlying encryption, V can compute Enc(PK, (b1−((s1 +α1c0)+α1a1))) from
Enc(PK, (s1+α1c0)), Enc(PK, a1), and Enc(PK, b1). Enc(PK, (b1−((s1+α1c0)+α1a1)))
is denoted by Enc(PK, plain1). Similarly, he gets Enc(PK,B1 − (S1 + α1A1)), de-
noted by Enc(PK, plain2). Using the additive homomorphism of underlying encryption,
from Enc(PK,A1) and from Enc(PK, a1), V computes Enc(PK,A1 + a1), denoted by
Enc(PK, plain3).
The second step is the quadratic consistency test. V randomly generates α2, α3, α4
all from F. He randomly generates queries q2, q3 and constructs following queries: q4 =
q2⊗q3, t = r1||R1+α0(r0||R0)+
∑3
i=2 αi(qi||0n
2
)+α4(0
n||q4). V queries P with (q2, q3, q4, t)
and gets back Enc(PK, a2), Enc(PK, a3), Enc(PK, a4), and Enc(PK, b2) where a2 =
〈q2, z〉, a3 = 〈q3, z〉, a4 = 〈q4, z ⊗ z〉, b2 = 〈t, z||z ⊗ z〉. We denote Enc(PK, (b2 −
((s1 + S1 + α0(s0 + S0)) +
∑4
i=2 αiai))) by Enc(PK, plain4), which can be computed
from Enc(PK, (s1 + S1 + α0(s0 + S0))), Enc(PK, ai)’s (i = 2, 3, 4) and Enc(PK, b2)
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using the homomorphism of the underlying cryptosystem. Then, V randomly generates
four random numbers from F: θ1, · · · , θ4, and constructs Enc(PK,
∑4
i=1 plaini · θi) from
Enc(PK, plaini)’s using the homomorphism. V sends Enc (PK,
∑4
i=1 plaini · θi) to C
with Enc(PK, a4), Enc(PK, a3), and Enc(PK, a2) to C.
We adopt the a variant of the El Gamal cryptosystem [8] as our additive homo-
morphic encryption. The cryptosystem operates over a group G of prime order q.
g ∈ G is a random generator of G. The ciphertext of m is Enc(pk,m) = (gk, gm+ak)
where (pk, sk) = (ga, a). It is easy to see this encryption is an additive homomor-
phic encryption. The ciphertext of the sum of two plaintexts could be constructed as:
Enc(pk,m1 +m2) = Enc(pk,m1) ·Enc(pk,m2) = (gk1+k2 , gm1+m2+a(k1+k2)). The third step
is to perform linearity tests. Since the underlying cryptosystem is addition homomorphic,
it is easy to check the linearity homomorphically.
4.3.4 Making A Decision
C first decrypts Enc(PK,∑4i=1 plaini · θi) and determines whether the plaintext is 0.
If not, C will reject. Otherwise C decrypts Enc(PK, a2), Enc(PK, a3) and Enc(PK, a2).
Then, C determines whether a2a3 = a4. If so, he will accept that y is the correct solution
of his computational task.
4.3.5 Security Analysis
Theorem 2. (Correctness) If the arithmetic circuit x is satisfiable, then a prover P with
the knowledge of the correct input y is able to make the client C accept y by performing
our protocol.
Proof. It is easy for a prover P who has found out the correct result y of the computation
task to find out the correct assignment z = (z1, z2, · · · , zn) including the correct result
y and all the intermediate results of the circuit. That is, z satisfies all the constraints
fu, u = 1, · · · , n. If P responds with correct values as in the protocol, all corresponding
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test equations (unencrypted version) will hold. Given the encryption used in this section
is additive homomorphic, the ciphertexts of all the corresponding linear combinations
are ciphertexts of 0. The conclusion follows.
Definition 3. We say that a verification protocol for the arithmetic circuit satisfiability
problem x wins λ-confidentiality if the following properties are satisfied. In the context of
computational complexity, x can be represented as a binary string, and so can the correct
assignment z. Let Px, Pz : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} be arbitrarily-defined predicates, extracting
one bit of information about binary strings of arbitrary length. For every probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A, for every possible transmitted messages m = (m1, · · · ,mk)
with k = |m| = poly(λ), for every positive polynomial p(·), for every Px, Pz, we have:
Pr[A(1λ,m, 1|z|, commt) = Px(x))]− 1
2
<
1
p(λ)
(4.3.1)
Pr[A(1λ,m, 1|z|, commt) = Pz(z))]− 1
2
<
1
p(λ)
(4.3.2)
where commt is the commitment information provided by C before verification. (The
probability is over z as well as over the internal coin tosses of either algorithms.)
Theorem 3. (Confidentiality) If the underlying homomorphic encryption in our protocol
has the security parameter λ, then our verification protocol for the arithmetic circuit
satisfiability problem wins λ-confidentiality.
Proof. Recall that the commitment is commt = (α1, s1, S1, c0, w0 + α1w
′
1, (r1||R1) +
α0(r0||R0), Enc(PK, (s1 + S1 + α0(s0 + S0))). Given that all transmitted messages m =
(m1,m2, · · · ,mk) are encrypted in our protocol, for every probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A∗ such that
Pr[A(1λ,m, 1|z|, commt) = xi)]
< Pr[A∗(1λ, 1|z|, H) = xi] +
1
p(λ)
(4.3.3)
where H = (α1, s1, S1, c0, w0 + α1w
′
1, (r1||R1) + α0(r0||R0)). This follows directly from
an appropriate formulation of semantic security ([57], Def. 5.2.1) of the underlying
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homomorphic encryption. Now since (r0||R0) is uniformly random, (r1||R1)+α0(r0||R0))
is random and independent of (r1||R1) by the crypto lemma. Therefore, s1, S1 is the
response of the prover to a query (on z) which is random and independent of (α1, c0, w0 +
α1w
′
1, (r1||R1) + α0(r0||R0)). This implies that the entire H is independent of x and z,
and hence for any algorithm A∗, Pr[A∗(1λ, 1|z|, H) = xi] ≤ 12 + 1p(λ) The inequalities in
(4.3.1) and (4.3.2) follow.
Theorem 3 implies that for sufficiently large λ, the advantage of an adversary finds
out the circuit and the results in the execution of the protocol is negligible.
Theorem 4. (soundness) The client will accept a wrong answer with probability less
than ≤ 4|F| − 1|F|2 + (1− (3δ−6δ2))k where the tests guarantee the proof is δ-close to linear
and k is the number of iterations of the linearity tests.
Proof. For any given wrong proof p˜i which consists of p˜i(1) and p˜i(2), we define the following
events:
E0 = {p˜i are accepted}
E1 = {p˜i is not committed}
E2 = {p˜i is not linear}
E3 = {p˜i(1) and p˜i(2) are not quadratic consistent}
E4 = {p˜i is not circuit correct}
If an incorrect answer is accepted by the client, then p˜i passes four kinds of tests:
decommitment (DT, denoted by Test1), linearity test (LT, denoted by Test2), quadratic
consistency test (QT, denoted by Test3), and the circuit correctness test (CT, denoted
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by Test4). Thus,
Pr[E0]
=Pr[(E1 OR E2 OR E3 OR E4) AND passing 4 tests]
=Pr[
4⋃
i=1
(Ei AND passing 4 tests)]
≤Pr[
4⋃
i=1
(Ei AND passing Testi)]
≤
4∑
i=1
Pr[(Ei AND passing Testi)]
Analysis of the commitment/decommitment protocol [9] shows that
Pr[p˜i is not commited AND passing DT] ≤ 1
F
. (4.3.4)
The commitment/decommitment protocol also executes the linearity test [59]. It is
shown ([59]) that
Pr[p˜i is δ close to linear AND passing LT] ≤ (1− (3δ − 6δ2))k. (4.3.5)
where k is the number of iterations of the linearity tests.
Each quadratic consistence test trial will reject the wrong proof with probability
at least (|F|−1)
2
|F|2 [7]. Thus, each quadratic consistence test will wrongly accept with
probability at most 1− (|F|−1)2|F|2 = 2|F|−1|F|2 .
Each circuit correctness test trial will wrongly accept a proof with probability at most
1
|F| [7]. Thus,
Pr[E0] ≤ 1|F| + (1− (3δ − 6δ
2))k + (
2|F| − 1
|F|2 ) + (
1
|F|)
=
4
|F| −
1
|F|2 + (1− (3δ − 6δ
2))k (4.3.6)
This holds for any incorrect p˜i. Given that for a wrong answer y, any proof p˜i is
incorrect, the client will accept this wrong answer with probability less than 4|F| − 1|F|2 +
(1 − (3δ − 6δ2))k where the tests guarantee the proof is δ-close to linear and k is the
number of iterations of the linearity tests.
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4.4 Practical Use and Complexity Analysis
4.4.1 Amortized Query Costs
Our proposed schemes can amortize query costs. That is, our designs are able to use
the same commitment/decommitment queries and PCP queries across many instances of
the same circuit (with different input/output). The same commitment/decommitment
queries and PCP queries make sure that it is still infeasible for P to know the secret
commit query and provide uncommitted responses. (It is known that if we fix a given
instance, the probability of wrongly accepting will not be influenced by other instances
[8].)
The amortizing usage is as follows.
1. There is an off-line stage. In this stage, C reads the circuit and constructs the
commitment queries and sends to P . This is done only once.
2. P possesses β proofs (linear functions) p˜i1, · · · , p˜iβ, one for each instance. For
commitment construction, P will return β tuples of commitments, each of which
is as in the previous section.
3. For each instance, P computes the results.
4. In the verification phase, for the same query tuple q1, · · · , q4, t from V , P will
response β tuples of answers, each for one instance. For each instance, V verifies
results as in the previous section. Totally, V runs β decommitments, β circuit tests,
and β quadratic consistency tests, one for each instance.
We give a practical use example here. Suppose C has a large number of computational
tasks. All these tasks can be reduced to an instance of the Circuit-SAT problem with
the same circuit. Before using the Cloud server to do computing, C will generate the
commitment queries: w0, r1, R1, r0, R0. This is an off-line stage and it runs only once for
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Table 4.2 Comparison of Complexity for Each Instance
Computation Communication
Our Basic Scheme
C’s cost 0 m + O(1)
V’s cost m ·Mult +m · Add + 1
β
[n2 ·Mult + (4n) · RNG] 1
β
O(n2)
Our Full Solution
C’s cost (m + 1) ·Mult +m · Add + Enc + 3Dec m + O(1)
V’s cost poly(λ) · Oper + O(1) ·Mult + O(1) · Add + 1
β
[n2 ·Mult + (4n) · RNG] 1
β
O(n2)
Re-computing ≥ [poly(n) ·Mult + poly(n) · Add] 0
NP-proof poly(n) ·Mult + poly(n) · Add n
Linear PCP (Ishai et al.) poly(n) ·Mult + poly(n) · Add O(n2)
GINGER [(m + 1) ·Mult +m · Add] + 1
β
[poly(n) ·Mult + poly(n) · Add + (n2 + 2n) · RNG] 1
β
O((n +m)2)
all instances. The on-line stage is as in Section 4.3. First, C gives the computing tasks to
P . Secondly, P computes the tasks and gives back the results and the commitments to
C. After choosing a verifier V , C outsources the verification to V . V advises C to accept
or reject.
4.4.2 Complexity Analysis
Our design meets the efficiency goal outlined in Section 4.1.3. As in [58], we are
ignoring the time of the oﬄine stage, since the cost of generating the commit/decommit
queries can be amortized over many instances. We compare the computational cost and
the communication cost of C between our protocol and other related work in Table 4.2.
In this table, Mult and Add are the cost of multiplication and addition in F. RNG is the
cost of generating a random number in F. Oper is the cost of the additive homomorphic
operation. In our design, the computational and communication complexity of C for
each instance is O(m), (m is the length of results y) and is not dependent on the circuit
size n. This is much more efficient than all current two-party verification schemes. We
observe that V is also very efficient. Even the cost of both C and V combined is less than
the verifier’s cost in the state-of-the-art argument systems that rely only on standard
cryptographic assumptions.
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4.5 Mathematical Proof of the Commitment
We prove the main theorem through several lemmas and other theorems. Our idea
is to prove that, if combining our commitment construction protocol with either of our
decommitment phases, the answers of the prover is guaranteed to be bound to a function.
Then, we prove the two functions are actually the same function.
For combining our commitment construction protocol with either of our decommit-
ment phases, we provide a Lemma stating that efficiently solving a certain cryptographic
problem is infeasible. Then, we show that if the prover’s answers are not bound, we can
construct an efficient algorithm to solve that hard cryptographic problem. The binding
property follows.
Specifically, we first prove that first decommitment protocol checks will guarantee the
prover’s output is bound to a function σ˜ with high probability (Theorem 6 and Corollary
7). Otherwise an efficient algorithm can solve an infeasible cryptographic problem that
contradicts Lemma 5. Then, we prove the second decommitment protocol checks will
guarantee the prover’s output is bound to a function ρ˜ with high probability (Theorem
9 and Corollary 10). Otherwise an efficient algorithm will contradict Lemma 8. Lastly,
we prove if we combine the first and the second decommitments, the prover’s output
is guaranteed to be bound to a single function p˜i with high probability (Theorem 13).
Otherwise we can construct an efficient algorithm that contradicts Lemma 12. That is,
with high probability σ˜(q) = ρ˜(q) , p˜i(q).
Lemma 5. Let X be the tuple
(pk, Enc(pk,R1||r1),Φ, w1, w0 + α1w1, w0 + α′1w1).
For every efficient algorithm A, we have
Pr[A(X) = α1] ≤ 1|F| + neg(n) (4.5.1)
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where R1 ∈ Fn2, r1, w0, w1 ∈ Fn, α1, α′1 ∈ F, and Φ is the constraint function that
R1, r1, w0 satisfy, and neg() is a negligible function of its input. The probability is over
all w0 as well as the randomness of functions Enc and Gen of the underlying cryptosystem.
Proof. From the semantic security ([57], Def. 5.2.2), for every efficient A, there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A′ such that
Pr[A(X) = α1]
≤Pr[A′(Φ, w1, w0 + α1w1, w0 + α′1w1) = α1] + neg(n) (4.5.2)
Given that the constraint function Φ is independent on the tuple w1, w0 +α1w1, w0 +
α′1w1, the knowledge of Φ will not help any function A′ to figure out α1. Thus, for every
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A′ we have
Pr[A′(Φ, w1, w0 + α1w1, w0 + α′1w1) = α1]
=Pr[A′(w1, w0 + α1w1, w0 + α′1w1) = α1]
≤1/|F| (4.5.3)
The conclusion follows from 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.
Theorem 6. Our commitment construction protocol combined with the first decommit-
ment protocol is a commitment with linear decommitment.
Proof. The correctness is straightforward. Now we prove the binding property.
For any environment E and efficient malicious prover P∗, define the following exper-
iment. P∗ plays the role of P . Now, invoke the decommitment phase with P∗ and V
twice, using the same commitment phase and w1, but different α1. We say P∗ wins if
V accepts two distinct values a1, a′1, or accepts two distinct values A1, A′1. Assume P∗
wins with non-negligible probability. Then, there is an environment E and an efficient
malicious prover P∗ with a weight vector w1 such that for random pair α1, α′1, P∗ returns
40
(a1, a
′
1) and (A1, A
′
1) to V and makes him accept at least one of the two pairs with non-
negligible probability. We show that this fact implies that we can construct an algorithm
A that will contradict Lemma 5. Let w2 be the value of w0 + α1w1 and w′2 be the value
of w0 + α
′
1w1. When (pk, Enc(pk, w0), w2, w
′
2) is input, A executes following operations,
corresponding to the steps of the protocol.
1. A gives P∗ (pk, Enc(pk, w0)).
2. P∗ gives back two values (e1, E1) which A ignores.
3. A gives P∗ (w1, w2) and receives back (a1, b1) and (A1, B1).
4. A gives P∗ (w1, w′2) and receives back (a′1, b′1) and (A′1, B′1).
From w2 = w0 +α1w1 and w
′
2 = w0 +α
′
1w1, A can figure out (α1−α′1)w1 = w2−w′2.
Given that there must be a index j such that w1j 6= 0 (otherwise w1 = 0 and the protocol
need not to be invoked), A can have
α1 − α′1 = (w2j − w′2j)/wj (4.5.4)
Then, from b1 = s1 + α1a1, b
′
1 = s1 + α1a
′
1, B1 = S1 + α1A1, and B
′
1 = S1 + α1A
′
1, A
can have
b1 − b′1 = α1a1 − α′1a′1 (4.5.5)
B1 −B′1 = α1A1 − α′1A′1 (4.5.6)
From the assumption above, at least one of the following holds with non-negligible
probability: a1 6= a′1 and A1 6= A′1. Without loss of generality, let us say a1 6= a′1 holds
with non-negligible probability. Then, A can compute α1 from (4.5.4) and (4.5.5). this
contradicts Lemma 5.
Corollary 7. For our commitment construction protocol combined with the first decom-
mitment, the following holds. For any environment E, any accepted output of V at the
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end of the decommitment phase is guaranteed to be a function σ˜(q) = Ext(vP∗ , vV , q)
except with negligible probability in n, where vP∗ , vV are the views of P∗ and V in the
commitment phase, q is the query in decommitment phase generated by E, Ext is a (pos-
sibly inefficient) extractor which given the views of P∗ and V in the commitment phase
“extracts” a function to which P∗ is committed, and the probability is over all randomness
of P∗ and V in both phases.
Proof. Given that our commitment construction protocol combined with the first decom-
mitment protocol is a commitment with linear decommitment (Theorem 6), the Corollary
follows directly from Lemma 3.2 of [7].
Lemma 8. Let X be the tuple
{pk, Enc(pk,R1||r1), Enc(pk,R0||r0), (R1||r1) + α0(R0||r0) + αq, (R1||r1) + α0(R0||r0) + α′q}
For every q ∈ Fn+n2 and every efficient algorithm A, we have
Pr[A(X) = α] ≤ 1|F| + neg(n) (4.5.7)
where R1, R0 ∈ Fn2, r1, r0 ∈ Fn, α, α′ ∈ F. The probability is over all R1||r1, R0||r0,
α, α′, α0, as well as the randomness of functions Enc and Gen of the underlying cryp-
tosystem. Note: R0||r0 is uniformly distributed in Fn+n2; however, R1||r1 is a punctured
vector in Fn+n2. Namely, R1||r1 have many fixed components with the value 0.
Proof. From the semantic security ([57], Def. 5.2.2), for every efficient A, there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A′ such that
Pr[A(X) = α]
≤Pr[A′((R1||r1) + α0(R0||r0) + αq, (R1||r1) + α0(R0||r0) + α′q) = α]
+neg(n) (4.5.8)
For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A′ we have
Pr[A′((R1||r1) + α0(R0||r0) + αq, (R1||r1) + α0(R0||r0) + α′q) = α] ≤ 1/|F| (4.5.9)
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The conclusion follows from 4.5.8 and 4.5.9.
Theorem 9. Our commitment construction protocol combined with the second decom-
mitment is a commitment to a function with multiple decommitments (CFMD) with
B = 1/|F|+ neg(n).
Proof. The correctness is straightforward. Now, we prove the binding property. We will
show that if P∗ can systematically cheat, then there exists an efficient algorithm that
takes
{pk, Enc(pk,R1||r1), Enc(pk,R0||r0),
(R1||r1) + α0(R0||r0) + αq, (R1||r1) + α0(R0||r0) + α′q}
as input and outputs α with probability more than 1|F| + neg(n). It contradicts Lemma
8.
Suppose the binding property does not hold. Then, there exists an environment E
and an efficient malicious prover P∗. E produces (q1, q2, · · · , qµ) and (q′1, q′2, · · · , q′µ) such
that there exist indices i and j satisfying qi = q
′
j , q. P∗ returns a1, a2, · · · , aµ and
a′1, a
′
2, · · · , a′µ among which ai 6= a′j to V , and makes V accept them with probability
more than 1|F|+neg(n). The probability is over the randomness of the commit phase and
of two runnings of the decommit phase.
We show that the existence of i, j implies that we can construct an algorithm A that
will contradict Lemma 8. For any (α, α′), let v be the value of (R1||r1) + αq and v′ be
the value of (R1||r1) + α′q. When
{pk, Enc(pk,R1||r1), Enc(pk,R0||r0), v, v′, R0||r0}
is input, A executes following operations according to the protocol.
1. A gives P∗: (pk, Enc(pk,R1||r1), Enc(pk,R0||r0)).
2. P∗ gives back two values (e1, e2) which A ignores.
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3. A randomly generates (α1, · · ·αi−1, αi+1, · · · , αµ) and (α′1, · · ·α′j−1, α′j+1, · · · , α′µ);
4. A constructs two queries v +∑k∈[µ]\i αkqk and v′ +∑k∈[µ]\j α′kq′k.
5. A gives the two queries constructed in the last step to P∗ and receives back two
values (b, b′).
6. A gives P∗ (q1, q2, · · · , qµ) and (q′1, q′2, · · · , q′µ). A receives back a1, a2, · · · , aµ and
a′1, a
′
2, · · · , a′µ.
From v = (R1||r1)+α0(R0||r0)+αq and v′ = (R1||r1)+α0(R0||r0)+α′q, A can figure
out (α−α′)q = v− v′. Given that there must be an index k such that qk 6= 0 (otherwise
q = (0, · · · , 0) and the protocol need not to be invoked), A can have
α− α′ = (vk − v′k)/qk (4.5.10)
Then, from b = s1 +α0s0 +αai +
∑
k∈[µ]\i αkak, b
′ = s1 +α0s0 +α′a′j +
∑
k∈[µ]\j α
′
ka
′
k,
A can have
αai − α′a′j
=(b− b′)− (
∑
k∈[µ]\i
αkak −
∑
k∈[µ]\j
α′ka
′
k) (4.5.11)
From the assumption above, ai 6= a′j holds with probability more than 1|F| + neg(n).
Then, A can compute α from equations (4.5.10) and (4.5.11). It contradicts Lemma 8.
Corollary 10. For our commitment construction protocol combined with the second
decommitment, the following holds. For any environment E, any accepted output of V
at the end of the decommitment phase is guaranteed to be a function ρ˜(q) except with
negligible probability in n, where q is the query in decommit phase generated by E, and
the probability is over all randomness of P∗ and V in both commit and decommit phases.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 9 and Lemma B.2 of [8].
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To prove our final Theorem, we will prepare two Lemmas: Lemma 11 and Lemma
12. Lemma 12 is a theoretical result based on Lemma 11. We show in the proof of our
final Theorem that we will be able to construct a contradiction against Lemma 12 if P∗
can systematically cheat.
Lemma 11. Let X be the tuple
{pk, Enc(pk,R1||r1), (R1||r1) + αq, (R1||r1) + α′q}
where R1 ∈ Fn2, r1 ∈ Fn, α, α′ ∈ F. However, R1||r1 is a punctured vector in Fn+n2 as
it is constructed in our protocol. Namely, R1||r1 have many fixed components with the
value 0.
Then, for every q that is constructed in the same way as R1||r1 (namely, q has the
same fixed components 0 as R1||r1), and every efficient algorithm A, we have
Pr[A(X) = α] ≤ 1|F| + neg(n), (4.5.12)
The probability is over all R1||r1, α, α′, as well as the randomness of functions Enc and
Gen of the underlying cryptosystem.
Proof. From the semantic security ([57], Def. 5.2.2), for every efficient A, there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A′ such that
Pr[A(X) = α]
≤Pr[A′((R1||r1) + αq, (R1||r1) + α′q) = α]
+neg(n) (4.5.13)
For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A′ we have
Pr[A′((R1||r1) + αq, (R1||r1) + α′q) = α]
≤1/|F| (4.5.14)
It follows that Pr[A(X) = α] ≤ 1|F| + neg(n)
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Lemma 12. Let X be the tuple {pk, Enc(pk,R1||r1), (R1||r1)+αq, (R1||r1)+α′q}. Then,
for any (probably unknown) function f(·) : Fn+n2 7→ F, any vector R0||r0 ( R0||r0 6=
R1||r1), and s (the correponding value of f(R0||r0)), for every q that is constructed in
the same way as R1||r1 (namely, q has the same fixed components 0 as R1||r1), and every
efficient algorithm A, we have:
Pr[A(X,R0||r0, s) = α] ≤ 1|F| + neg(n), (4.5.15)
where R1, R0 ∈ Fn2, r1, r0 ∈ Fn, α, α′ ∈ F. The probability is over all R1||r1, α, α′, as
well as the randomness of functions Enc and Gen of the underlying cryptosystem. Note:
R0||r0 is uniformly distributed in Fn+n2; however, R1||r1 is a punctured vector in Fn+n2.
Namely, R1||r1 have many fixed components with the value 0.
Proof. Since R1||r1, R0||r0, and the function f(·) are independent, the information of
R0||r0 and s will not help any algorithm A to solve α. The conclusion follows directly
from Lemma 11.
Theorem 13. For our commitment construction protocol combined with both the first
and second decommitment, the following holds. For any environment E, any accepted
output of V at the end of the decommitment phase in each protocol, is guaranteed to be
bound to the same function p˜i(q) except with probability less than 1|F| + neg(n), where q
is the query in either of the decommitment phases generated by E, and the probability is
over all randomness of P∗ and V in all phases. That is, for all q’s, σ˜(q) = ρ˜(q) , p˜i(q)
holds except with probability less than 1|F| + neg(n), where σ˜(q) and ρ˜(q) are defined in
Corollary 7 and Corollary 10.
Proof. We will show that if P∗ can systematically output σ˜(q) 6= ρ˜(q), then there exists
an efficient algorithm that takes
{pk, Enc(pk,R1||r1), (R1||r1) + αq, (R1||r1) + α′q, R0||r0, s}
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as input and outputs α with probability more than 1|F| + neg(n). where (R1||r1), α, α′, q
and R0||r0, s are as in Lemma 12. That contradicts Lemma 12.
Suppose there is a malicious prover P∗ which can systematically output σ˜(q) 6= ρ˜(q)
with probability more than 1|F| + neg(n). Then, there exists an environment E that
produces a function f(·) that f(R0||r0) = s, q′1 and (q1, q2, · · · , qµ) such that there exists
a index i satisfying q′1 = qi , q, and P∗ returns a′1 (for q′1) and a1, a2, · · · , aµ (for
(q1, q2, · · · , qµ)), where a′1 6= ai, to V and makes V accept them with probability more
than 1|F|+neg(n). The probability is over the randomness of the commit phase and of two
runnings of the decommit phase. Note: in our protocol, q′1 is not sent explicitly. Instead,
q′1 was sent implicitly through the weight vector w1. Thus, q
′
1 is a “punctured” vector in
Fn+n2 , with many fixed components of value 0. Correspondingly, qi is also “punctured”
vector in Fn+n2 , with many fixed components of value 0.
We show that the existence of i implies that we can construct an algorithm A that
will contradict Lemma 12. For random (α, α′), let v be the value of (R1||r1) + αq and
v′ be the value of (R1||r1) + α′q. When {pk, Enc(pk,R1||r1), v, v′, R0||r0, s} is input, A
executes following operations according to the protocol.
1. A encryptsR0||r0 to Enc(pk,R0||r0) and gives P∗: (pk, Enc(pk,R1||r1), Enc(pk,R0||r0)).
2. P∗ gives back two values (e1, e2) which A ignores.
3. A randomly generates (α0, α1, · · ·αi−1, αi+1, · · · , αµ) and α′;
4. A constructs two queries v + α0(R0||r0) +
∑
k∈[µ]\i αkqk and v
′.
5. A gives P∗ v + α0(R0||r0) +
∑
k∈[µ]\i αkqk and v
′. and receives back two values
(b, b′).
6. A gives P∗ (q1, q2, · · · , qµ) and q′1. A receives back a1, a2, · · · , aµ and a′1.
From v = (R1||r1) + αq and v′ = (R1||r1) + α′q, A can figure out (α− α′)q = v − v′.
Given that there must be a index k such that q(k), q’s kth entry is non-zero (otherwise
47
q = (0, · · · , 0) and the protocol need not to be invoked), A can have
α− α′ = (v(k) − v′(k))/q(k) (4.5.16)
Then, from b = s1 + α0s0 + αai +
∑
k∈[µ]\i αkak, b
′ = s1 + α′a′1, A can have
αai − α′a′1 = (b− b′)− (α0s0)− (
∑
k∈[µ]\i
αkak) (4.5.17)
From the assumption above, ai 6= a′1 holds with probability more than 1|F| + neg(n).
Then, A can compute α from equations (4.5.16) and (4.5.17) with probability more than
1
|F| + neg(n). It contradicts Lemma 12.
The proof of the Main Theorem (Theorem 1) follows directly from Theorem 13.
4.6 Conclusions and Future Directions
In Cloud Computing, a client outsources computation to a more powerful server –
the prover. To ensure the correctness of the results returned by the prover, the client
has to perform a verification stage that is often tedious and expensive. In this work, we
introduce the idea of delegation of verification in Cloud Computing. This natural ap-
proach relieves the client from performing the verification of the outsourced-computation
results by outsourcing it to a third party – the verifier. We propose the first scheme that
provides efficient outsourcing of the verification, while at the same time preserving the
confidentiality of both the computational task and its result from untrusted verifiers.
Given that the computational tasks are not limited to a specific computational prob-
lem, it appears at a first glance that the fully-homomorphic encryption is necessary for
hiding the computational task. However, by means of combining a novel commitment
protocol and the linear PCP system with only additive homomorphic encryption, our
design enables a honest-but-curious third party to perform the bulk of the verification
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procedure, without gaining access to information about the original computational task
or its result. We are currently investigating delegation of verification with a verifier who
does not perform the protocol faithfully – a curious and lazy verifier.
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CHAPTER 5. VERIFIABLE COMPUTATION WITH
REDUCED INFORMATIONAL COSTS AND
COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
5.1 Motivation
The state-of-the-art Zaatar [10] showed the connection between Linear PCP and
QAP. However, unlike other QAP-based designs [13] [14], Zaatar relies only on standard
cryptographic assumptions. It applies QAP into the framework of PCP and generates
a novel verifiable computation scheme. Moreover, as an appealing verifiable computa-
tion scheme, Zaatar makes the prover more efficient than any other PCP-based designs.
However, Zaatar does not bring major improvements to the verifier’s computational cost.
As in the recent PCP-based works [7] [60] [8] [9], once the prover has committed to the
proof, the most computationally-intensive part for the verifier in Zaatar is the generation
of queries. The high costs of the verifier are hence lowered by reusing some of the queries
for multiple instances of the same problem – or batching. For computational tasks that
can tolerate large batch sizes, the costs of verification in Zaatar can be driven down
by amortizing. However, for tasks that require low investment on the verification and
tolerate only small batch sizes, a new, more efficient protocol is needed.
Besides the computation and communication costs that have been concerned in exist-
ing research of verifiable computation, another type of verification cost has been generally
ignored until now. We call this the informational cost – the cost associated with infor-
mation required for verification on both sides. The verifier’s information required for
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verification usually consists of verification keys and the full knowledge of the computa-
tion task. The prover’s informational costs usually consists of the proof vector.
The informational cost generally has a strong impact on the adoption of the verifi-
cation algorithms. On one hand, the size of the required information directly influences
the memory cost for verification, and the speed of verification. For the memory cost,
verifiers in existing research keep the required information in a large memory and fre-
quently access it. For the speed, the length of the proof vector determines the cost
of generating, and responding to, the queries while verifying. On the other hand, the
informational cost implies the privacy/confidentiality issues. One obvious risk is that,
storing this information itself introduces potential leakage of sensitive information about
the computational task and its results. A more serious risk occurs in the context of the
third party verification. (For example, disputes between the server and the client can be
solved by an arbitrator who plays the role of the third-party verifier. Similar verifications
may be required by government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and consumer safety
organization, for the purpose of quality evaluation, project management, etc.) In such
scenarios, information cost implies the computation task and its results being delivered
to the third party. However, once delivered, the information is out of the control of the
client and the client can never call them back. This security issue, in turn, may limit
the outsourcing of verification.
As far as informational costs are concerned, all recent PCP-based works [7] [60]
[8] [9], [10] require the verifier to have full knowledge of the computation circuit while
performing the verification. Note: zero-knowledge property in proof systems refers to
the requirement that nothing is known except the answer to the verifier. However, the
computation are known by both parties.
51
5.1.1 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we introduce RIVER, a Reduced-investment verified computation
protocol, whose improvement further enhances the practicality of argument systems in
verifiable computation. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• RIVER reduces the verifier’s workload that needs to be amortized. Namely, the
number of batched instances of the protocol, required for amortization, will largely
decrease. Instead of batching over instances of the same circuit as in existing
works, RIVER makes more parts of costs amortized over instances of all different
circuits of the same size. We model the costs and compare the costs using a
typical computation such as matrix multiplication, showing that RIVER is 28%
better than state-of-the-art Zaatar at the verifier side.
• As a side effect, RIVER increases the prover’s non-amortized cost and amortized
cost. However, the introduced non-amortized part is negligible. Although RIVER
introduces amortized cost to the prover side, this cost can be amortized over in-
stances of all different circuits of the same size.
• RIVER reduces the informational cost of the verifier, by removing the require-
ment that the verifier has to access the circuit description during query generating.
Thus, a third-party verifier can help generating the queries without knowing the
computation task details.
• RIVER adopts one of our theoretical findings. We show that under certain assump-
tions, the Single-Commit-Multi-Decommit protocol provides the inherent linearity
tests. Thus, a modified Single-Commit-Multi-Decommit protocol will make the
linearity tests obsolete and reduce verification costs.
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5.2 System Model
In the context of cloud computing, we propose a computation architecture involving
two parties: the client V , who is computationally weak, has computation tasks to be
delegated to the cloud; the cloud server P , who is computationally powerful, provides
computing services to the client. The computation tasks are formalized into the arith-
metic circuit – i.e., the computation task is performed over an arithmetic circuit. This is
pretty natural, since arithmetic circuits can be easily mapped to real-world computation
tasks1. Let Ψ be a |Ψ|-gate arithmetic circuit. The client V is providing the prover P
with Ψ and input X ∈ Fn, and expects P to return the correct output Y ∈ Fn′ . Then P
tries to convince V that Y is correct. P will hold a proof Z, which is a correct assignment
Z –the concatenation of the input X, output Y with all the intermediate results W inside
the circuit, (Z = X||Y ||W ) and has length |Z| = m, where W is the intermediate result
vector W ∈ Fm−n−n′ of the circuit Ψ.
5.3 A Technique: A Commitment Providing Inherent
Linearity Tests
In the line of linear-PCP fashion verifiable computation designs, once the prover is
committed to a proof, the verifier has to perform laborious linearity tests to ensure the
proof is linear. In fact, the number of queries required to perform linearity tests dominate
the number of overall queries of the protocol. Thus, the cost caused by linearity test is
still one of the bottlenecks of current protocols. Up to now, in the context of Single-
Commit-Multi-Decommit protocol (refer to Section 3.5), whether the linearity tests are
necessary was still an open question. In this section, we propose our theoretical result,
showing that under an assumption, the Single-Commit-Multi-Decommit protocol will
1Existing compilers can turn high-level programs into arithmetic circuits [9], [10], [14]. For simplicity,
we omit these techniques.
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provides inherent linearity tests. Thus, if linear PCP is combined with this commitment
protocol, the linearity tests are obsolete. We will adopt the following theoretical results
in our protocol design and thus achieve cost savings.
Theorem 14. The Single-Commit-Multi-Decommit protocol ensures that, if the secret
commit information is generated by the prover using an affine function (analytically
defined), (or equivalent to the cases that is generated by the verifier himself), for all
query tuples, unless the sender (or prover) replies to all queries with the same linear
function and he knows the analytic description of this linear function, the prover will not
pass the decommitment test except with probability 1|F| + S, where the probability is over
the randomness of the prover and the verifier in the decommitment phase.
Proof. Let pi() denote the proof in the PCP sense. The prover knows that, when the
verifier generates the commitment information pi(r), he uses the linear function F1(·),
such that pi(r) = F1(r). We claim that in this scenario, the prover has to answer all
queries with the same linear function F1 – otherwise the probability that the prover
passes the decommitment test is less than 1|F| + S.
To prove this, we assume that there exists a PPT prover P∗, and queries q1, q2, · · · , qµ,
such that once committed, with these queries, the probability that P∗ answers the µ
queries with a function f(·) – such that there exists at least one index k for which
f(qk) 6= F1(qk) – and passes the decommitment test, is more than 1|F| + S, where the
probability is over the randomness of the prover and the verifier in the decommitment
phase.
We can now modify P∗ and make it into an algorithm P† which can solve the problem
stated in Lemma 15 with probability more than 1|F| + S:
1. P† has inputs: Enc(r), r + αqk, qk
2. P† uses Enc(r) as inputs and runs P∗’s commitment phase.
3. P∗ outputs with Enc(F1(r) which P† will neglect.
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4. P† produces a set of coefficients {α1, · · · , αk−1, αk+1, · · · , αµ−1, αµ}, and runs P∗’s
decommitment phase with following: {q1, q2, . . . , qµ−1, qµ, (r + αqk) +
∑k−1
i=1 αiqi +∑µ
i=k+1 αiqi}..
5. P∗ outputs {f(q1), . . . , f(qµ), F1(r)+αf(qk)+
∑k−1
i=1 αif(qi)+
∑µ
i=k+1 αif(qi)}. This
will pass the decommitment test with probability more than 1|F| + S.
6. Having access to {α1, · · · , αk−1, αk+1, · · · , αµ−1, αµ}, and f(q1), . . . , f(qµ), P† can
now obtain an equation of the form F1(r) + αf(qk) = b (where b ∈ F is easily
calculated).
Recall that P† has knowledge of r+αqk, which yields a group of n linearly-independent
linear equations in the form of r + αqk = a. Given that F1(qk) 6= f(qk), the equation
F1(r) + αf(qk) = b is linearly independent of the former n equations r + αqk = a. Thus,
A can solve for α from these n+ 1 linearly independent equations. This will contradict
Lemma 15:
Lemma 15. (from [7]) For any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, any q ∈ Fn,
and any uniformly-randomly picked r ∈ Fn we have Pr[A(Enc(r), r + αq, q) = α] ≤
1
|F| + S, where S is from the semantic security.
5.4 A Reduced-Investment Verifiable Computation Protocol:
RIVER
In this section, we introduce RIVER(reduced-investment verifiable computation pro-
tocol), an improvement of Zaatar [10], aimed at reducing the amortized cost of the verifier
– or equivalently, the number of instances required before amortization can be considered
complete. We accomplishes this by deferring some of the verifier’s amortizable compu-
tation to the prover. In doing so, two other benefits are achieved as side effects. First,
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the overall cost for the verifier is decreased when compared to Zaatar (and implicitly
also to Ginger). This is despite deferring some of the amortized computation to the
prover (the deferred part is almost negligible when compared to the construction of the
proof). Second, RIVER enables the verifier to generate queries independently – that
is, the query generating stage does not require full knowledge of the circuit. We detail
RIVER as follows.
5.4.1 PCP Querying
Our main observation is that the PCP query generation in Zaatar is somewhat re-
dundant. RIVER removes the redundancy by employing three rounds of PCP querying
and one round of decision making. The logical procedure is demonstrated in Figure 5.1.
5.4.2 PCP Querying of RIVER
Let l = |CR|. We represent the QAP polynomials Ai(t), Bi(t), Ci(t), with i =
0, 1, · · · ,m explicitly as:
Ai(t) = a
(i)
l t
l + a
(i)
l−1t
l−1 + · · ·+ a(i)1 t+ a(i)0 (5.4.1)
Bi(t) = b
(i)
l t
l + b
(i)
l−1t
l−1 + · · ·+ b(i)1 t+ b(i)0 (5.4.2)
Ci(t) = c
(i)
l t
l + c
(i)
l−1t
l−1 + · · ·+ c(i)1 t+ c(i)0 (5.4.3)
Evaluation of any one of these polynomials at the point t = τ can be expressed as a
linear function: Ai(τ) = pi
(i)
A (qH) = 〈K(i)A , qH〉, Bi(τ) = pi(i)B (qH) = 〈K(i)B , qH〉, Ci(τ) =
pi
(i)
C (qH) = 〈K(i)C , qH〉, where qH = (1, τ, τ 2, · · · , τ l) and
K
(i)
A = (a
(i)
l , a
(i)
l−1, · · · , a(i)1 , a(i)0 ) (5.4.4)
K
(i)
B = (b
(i)
l , b
(i)
l−1, · · · , b(i)1 , b(i)0 ) (5.4.5)
K
(i)
C = (c
(i)
l , c
(i)
l−1, · · · , c(i)1 , c(i)0 ). (5.4.6)
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ʌ(qH)¶V
V
qA
qB
qC
ʌH (qH)
P
ʌW (qA), ʌW (qB),ʌW (qC)
Figure 5.1 PCP querying
We can simply express the PCP queries of Zaatar as
qA = (pi
m
A (qH), pi
m−1
A (qH), . . . , pi
n+n′+1
A (qH)) (5.4.7)
qB = (pi
m
B (qH), pi
m−1
B (qH), . . . , pi
n+n′+1
B (qH)) (5.4.8)
qC = (pi
m
C (qH), pi
m−1
C (qH), . . . , pi
n+n′+1
C (qH)). (5.4.9)
In RIVER, the verifier constructs qA, qB, qC by querying linear functions pi
i
A, pi
i
B, pi
i
C
(i = 0, · · · ,m) by a single query qH .
Similarly, we can express H(t) and D(t) as:
H(t) = hlt
l + hl−1tl−1 + · · ·+ h1t+ h0 (5.4.10)
D(t) = dlt
l + dl−1tl−1 + · · ·+ d1t+ d0, (5.4.11)
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Table 5.1 The First Round of Our QAP-based Linear PCP
For every pi in the set of pi
(i)
A , pi
(i)
B , pi
(i)
C , (i = 0, 1, · · ·m) piD, perform the following:
• Divisibility queries generation. V randomly selects τ ∈R F. V takes qH ←
(1, τ, τ 2, · · · , τ l).
• Querying. V sends out qH and gets back pi(qH).
If all these proofs pass all linearity tests, V will have: piD(qH) and
• pi(m)A (qH), pi(m−1)A (qH), · · · , pi(0)A (qH),
• pi(m)B (qH), pi(m−1)B (qH), · · · , pi(0)B (qH),
• pi(m)C (qH), pi(m−1)C (qH), · · · , pi(0)C (qH),
and define: piH(·) = 〈KH , ·〉, where KH = (h0, h1, · · · , hl), and piD(·) = 〈KD, ·〉, where
KD = (d0, d1, · · · , dl). Zaatar points out that the evaluation of H(τ) can be viewed as
querying an oracle piH(·) with qH . Here, we argue that the same holds for the evaluation
of D(τ) – querying the oracle piD(·) with qH . The idea is detailed in Table 5.1. Note that
by comparison, Zaatar requires the queries qA, qB, qC , along with D(τ) to be entirely com-
puted by V . It should be mentioned that computing these queries by querying another
set of proofs requires additional commitments and testing. However, the procedure can
be simplified by removing all linearity tests for these 3m+ 4 = 3(m+ 1) + 1 proofs. The
reason this works is that, according to Theorem 14, our decommitment already provides
an inherent linearity test. In the second round of our design, V issues queries qH as in
Table 5.2. In the third round, V issues queries qA, qB, qC , qD as in Table 5.3. After V
collects all responses, he makes the decision as in Table 5.4.
5.4.3 Commit, Decommit and Consistency Verification of RIVER
To ensure the security of the protocol, P commits to all the linear functions mentioned
above. Similarly to Zaatar, our design inherits the single-commit-multiple-decommit
protocol from Ginger. For piH and piW , V and P run the IKO-style single-commit-multi-
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Table 5.2 The Second Round of Our QAP-based Linear PCP
V queries piH .
• Linearity queries generation. V selects q2, q3 ∈R Fl. Take q4 ← q3+q2. Perform
ρlin iterations in total.
• QAP queries generation. V takes qH ← (1, τ, τ 2, · · · , τ l) and q1 ← (qH + q2).
• Querying piH . V sends out q1, q2, · · · , q1+3ρ and gets back
piH(q1), piH(q2), · · · , piH(q1+3ρ).
• Linearity tests. Check whether following holds: piH(q4) = piH(q3) +piH(q2) and
likewise for all other ρ− 1 iterations. If not, reject.
At the end of this phase, if piH passes all linearity tests, V will have: piH(qH).
decommit protocol to generate the commitment. This part is omitted for simplicity.
For pi
(i)
A , pi
(i)
B , pi
(i)
C , (i = 0, 1, · · · ,m) and piD, the case is a bit more complex. We
note that in addition to the commitments and decommitments, V has to also verify the
consistency of the polynomials’ coefficient vectors corresponding to pi
(i)
A , pi
(i)
B , pi
(i)
C , for
i = 1, . . . ,m, and piD. Namely, V needs to make sure that P eventually uses pi(i)A , pi(i)B ,
pi
(i)
C , for i = 1, . . . ,m, and piD to answer V ’s queries.
To accomplish this, we use the technique in Section 5.3 and come up with the com-
mitment/decommitment protocol as follows: Before sending P his computation task, V
secretly generates a random number r and computes by himself the values Ai(r), Bi(r),
Ci(r) (i = 0, 1, · · ·m) and D(r), each of which represents, respectively, the commitment
for pi
(i)
A (), pi
(i)
B (), pi
(i)
C (), for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m, and piD(). The algorithm to compute these
values is demonstrated in Section 5.5.1. These values are stored for future decommit-
ment. This setup computation is done only once for different values of τ . In comparison
with Zaatar, where the setup requires the verifier to evaluate the queries associated with
different values of τ , a single r suffices for all τ ’s in RIVER, since the verifier outsources
extra computation to the prover. As in Table 5.5, our commitment design guarantees
the consistency of the polynomials’ coefficient vectors with the linear functions to which
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Table 5.3 The Second Round of Our QAP-based Linear PCP
V queries piW . Remember piW (·) = 〈W, ·〉, where W = (zm, zm−1, · · · , zN+1)
• Linearity queries generation. V select q4, q5 ∈R Fm−N . Take q6 ← q4 + q5.
Perform ρlin iterations in total.
• QAP queries generation. V takes:
– qA ← (pi(m)A (qH), pi(m−1)A (qH), · · · , pi(n+n
′+1)
A (qH)), and q1 ← (qA + q4).
– qB ← (pi(m)B (qH), pi(m−1)B (qH), · · · , pi(n+n
′+1)
B (qH)), and q2 ← (qB + q4).
– qC ← (pi(m)C (qH), pi(m−1)C (qH), · · · , pi(n+n
′+1)
C (qH)), and q3 ← (qC + q4).
• Querying piW . V sends out q1, q2, · · · , q3+3ρ and gets back
piW (q1), piW (q2), · · · , piW (q3+3ρ).
• Linearity tests. Check whether following holds: piW (q6) = pi(q4) + pi(q5) and
likewise for all other ρ − 1 iterations. If not, reject. Otherwise, accept and
output piW (qA) ← piW (q1) − piW (q4), piW (qB) ← piW (q2) − piW (q4), piW (qC) ←
piW (q3)− piW (q4).
P commits.
Theorem 16. Let pi be any of the linear functions pi
(i)
A , pi
(i)
B , pi
(i)
C and piD. By performing
our protocol, the commitment to pi is guaranteed to be bound to a linear function p˜i, and
the probability that pi 6= p˜i is at most 1/|F|. The probability is over all the randomness of
the prover.
Proof. Given that our protocol performs the single-commit-multi-decommit protocol
when querying pi, the response to the query is guaranteed to be bound to a linear function
p˜i. This feature is provided by the underlying single-commit-multi-decommit protocol.
If pi 6= p˜i but p˜i still passes the decommitment, p˜i(r) = pi(r) must hold. For all possible
choices of p˜i, only 1/|F| of them can satisfy this equation. However, r is unknown by the
prover. Thus, the probability that a dishonest prover chooses a p˜i 6= pi that passes the
decommitment is at most 1/|F|.
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Table 5.4 The Decision Making Stage of Our QAP-based Linear PCP
Decision Making: ( Note: (z1, z2, ·, zn+n′) = X||Y .)
• V computes:
– pA ←
∑(n+n′)
i=1 zi · pi(i)A (qH) + pi(0)A (qH)
– pB ←
∑(n+n′)
i=1 zi · pi(i)B (qH) + pi(0)B (qH)
– pC ←
∑(n+n′)
i=1 zi · pi(i)C (qH) + pi(0)C (qH)
• Divisibility Test. V checks whether the following holds: piD(qH) · piH(qH) =
(piZ(qA) + pA) · (piZ(qB) + pB)− (piZ(qC) + pC).
Table 5.5 Decommit Design for pi
(i)
A , pi
(i)
B , pi
(i)
C , (i = 0, 1, · · · ,m) and piD
P’s Input: linear functions piD, pi(i)A , pi(i)B , pi(i)C , for i = 1, . . . ,m.
V’s Input: Ai(r), Bi(r), Ci(r), i = 0, · · · ,m and D(r), t = (1, r, r2, · · · , rl). q1, · · · , qµ
Commitment
The verifier generates the commitment information as in Section 5.5.1.
Decommitment
Step 1: V picks µ secrets α1, · · · , αµ ∈ F
V queries P with q1, · · · , qµ and T = t+ α1q1 + · · ·+ αµqµ.
Step 2: P returns (pi(i)A (q1), · · · , pi(i)A (qµ), pi(i)A (T )), (pi(i)B (q1), · · · , pi(i)B (qµ), pi(i)B (T )),
(pi
(i)
C (q1), · · · , pi(i)C (qµ), pi(i)C (T )), where i = 0, · · · ,m and (piD(q1), · · · , piD(qµ), piD(T )).
Step 3: V checks whether pi(i)A (T ) = Ai(r) +
∑µ
j=1 αjpi
(i)
A (qj) and whether
pi
(i)
B (T ) = Bi(r) +
∑µ
j=1 αjpi
(i)
B (qj) and whether pi
(i)
C (T ) = Ci(r) +
∑µ
j=1 αjpi
(i)
C (qj),
i = 0, · · · ,m and piD(T ) = D(r) +
∑µ
j=1 αjpiD(qj) hold.
If so, V accepts. Otherwise, he rejects and output ⊥.
5.5 Performance Analysis
For the informational cost, it is straightforward to see that, once committed, all the
queries in the verification are not depending on the circuit description. Namely, during
the query generating of the verification stage, the verifier does not need to access the cir-
cuit information any more. Our design separates the verification workload that involves
only non-sensitive information from the verification workload that involves sensitive in-
formation (e.g. the circuit information). In the scenarios with a third-party verifier, the
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verifier can undertake the workload involving only non-sensitive information (e.g. query
generating) without knowing the secrecy of the computation task.
In the following, we derive the computational cost of our RIVER design and compare
it with previous work. In the process, we show that, similarly to Ginger and Zaatar, our
protocol batches many instances for one same circuit to reduce the cost per instance.
But RIVER can amortize more parts of amortized cost over all different circuits of the
same size.
5.5.1 The Verifier
This section performs an analysis of the verifier’s cost. A comparison with the veri-
fier’s costs in two other the state-of-the-art designs is given in Table 5.6.
Setup
. The cost that RIVER incurs upon the commitment is (|WR|+ |CR|) ·(e+c)/β. This
is because RIVER needs two commitment query constructions. One is for piH , and incurs
a cost of |CR| · (e+ c)/β, while the other is for piW , and incurs a cost of |WR| · (e+ c)/β.
This total cost is the same as that of Zaatar.
It is apparent that RIVER introduces additional workload to the setup stage. V has
to evaluate Ai(r), Bi(r), Ci(r) and D(r). However, we have discovered that a large part of
the computation cost is independent of the underlying circuits. Rather, the computation
only depends on the size of the circuit. This implies that this part of the computation can
be amortized over many different circuits, which only share the same size, rather than
over many different instances of the same circuit. To see this, first notice that the target
polynomial D(t) =
∏|CR|
k=1 (t− σk) does not depend on the circuit details, but rather D(t)
is determined by the circuit size. Hence, we can compute D(r) once for all circuits of
the same size, where r is the secret as in Section 5.4. If given in the form of generalized
Newton’s interpolation formula ([61], 4.6.4), D(r) can be evaluated in time |CR| · f .
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Second, we express Ai(t), Bi(t), Ci(t) in the form of Lagrange Polynomial interpolation:
Ai(t) =
∑|CR|
j=1 aij · lj(t), Bi(t) =
∑|CR|
j=1 bij · lj(t), Ci(t) =
∑|CR|
j=1 cij · lj(t), where lj(t) =∏
1≤k≤|CR|,k 6=j
(t−σk)
(σj−σk) are Lagrange basis polynomials. We can represent these Lagrange
basis polynomials as follows: lj(t) =
D(t)
(t−σj)· 1vj
, where vj = 1/
∏
0≤k≤|C|,k 6=j(σj − σk).
If we choose these σk (k = 1, · · · , |CR|) to follow an arithmetic progression [10], lj(r)
(j = 1, · · · , |CR|) can be evaluated in total time of (fdiv + 4f)|CR|. (Computing 1/vj+1
from 1/vj requires only two operations and computing 1/v0 uses |CR| multiplication.
Recall that D(r) is computed already. Finally, to get each lj(r), a multiplication and one
division are needed.) Given that both the evaluation of D(r) and lj(r) are independent
of the underlying circuit, we can amortize the cost of the evaluation into all circuits of
the same size.
The remaining work is to evaluate Ai(r), Bi(r), Ci(r) from the Lagrange polyno-
mials lj(r) (j = 1, · · · , |CR|). But this is reduced to merely several additions of lj(r)
polynomials – note that the coefficients aij, bij, cij are all either 0 or 1. The number of
wires in the circuit that can contribute to the multiplication gates is at most 2|CR|. The
total number of additions to evaluate Ai(r) and Bi(r) is at most the number of wires in
the circuit that can contribute to the multiplication gates. Then, the total number of
additions to evaluate Ai(r) and Bi(r) is at most 2|CR|. The total number of additions
to evaluate Ci(r) is (|WR| + |Y |), since it takes (|WR| + |CR|) · (e + c) to generate the
commitment queries (where, the whole cost of setup is at most (|WR|+ |CR|) · (e+c)/β+
(fdiv + 5f) · |CR|/β + (2|CR|+ |WR|+ |Y |) · g/β), where g is the cost of addition over a
finite field. Since g is small, we omit addition cost in the tables of cost, as Zaatar [10]
does.
Compared to Zaatar, RIVER introduces an extra cost of (fdiv+5f)·|CR|/β+(2|CR|+
|WR| + |Y |) · g/β to the total cost of setup. However, notice that this part of the
computation can be amortized over many different circuits, which only share the same
size, rather than over many different instances of the same circuit. Thus, RIVER actually
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introduces a negligible cost in the setup phase.
Linearity Query Generation
The cost of generating the linearity queries for piH is ρ ·ρlin ·2 · |CR| ·c/(β ·γ). Another
group of linearity queries are for the proof piW . The cost of generating these linearity
queries is ρ · ρlin · 2 · |WR| · c/(β · γ). Thus, the total cost of generating linearity queries
amounts to ρ · ρlin · 2 · (|CR|+ |WR|) · c/(β · γ).
Divisibility Query Generation, Decommitment Query Generation and De-
commitment Test
These are straight-forward, we omit these for simplicity.
Non-amortized Costs
From the construction above, we draw the following observations:
• For i = 1, · · · , n, we have Ci(t) = 0 for any t ∈ F, since the inputs of the circuit
cannot be outputs of multiplication gates.
• For i = n+ 1, · · · , n+ n′, we have Ai(t) = 0 for any t ∈ F, since the outputs of the
circuit Ψ′ cannot be inputs to multiplication gates.
• For i = n+ 1, · · · , n+n′, we have Bi(t) = 0 for any t ∈ F, since the outputs of the
circuit Ψ′ cannot be inputs to multiplication gates.
Thus, the verifier’s cost in the decision making stage (computing pA, pB, pC) is merely
ρ · (2|X|+ |Y |) · f .
Comparison with Zaatar
We list the amortized and non-amortized cost of both RIVER and Zaatar in Table
5.6. At this time, it is useful to take WR = WZ and CR = CZ .
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We can see that, both the amortized and non-amortized cost of RIVER are less than
Zaatar. For the amortized part, which is known as the investment, even for cases when
β = 1 and γ = 1, the cost of RIVER is less than Zaatar. ( To have a clear picture,
we look at a real example: computing xA where the input x is a 1 × M vector and
A is a fixed M × M matrix. This is widely used in all kinds of scientific computing
such as communications, signal processing, and control systems, and is a basic operation
of many computations. We use previously published models ([10]) and instantiate the
costs as in Table 5.6. From the instance, for M > 5000, We see the amortized cost in
RIVER is at least 28% less than that in Zaatar. For M < 5000, the improvement is even
greater.) Since the same part of the amortized cost in RIVER and Zaatar is dominated
by linearity test queries, if we apply the query compressing technique in Ginger ([37]),
RIVER will have a more significant improvement compared to Zaatar.
5.5.2 The Prover
The method to construct the proof vector is the same as that in Zaatar. The cost is
T+3f · |CR| · log2|CR|. We omit the details here. The remaining cost is from the fact that
the prover needs to compute the coefficients of Ai(t), Bi(t), and Ci(t), (i = 0, 1, · · · ,m).
However, this could be amortized. First, remember that each of Ai(t), Bi(t) and Ci(t),
(i = 0, 1, · · · ,m) are sums of several Lagrange basis polynomials. The cost to get the
coefficients of the Lagrange basis polynomials is independent of the underlying circuit and
can be amortized into all circuits of the same size and is negligible. Second, similarly to
Section 5.2, the number of additions of Lagrange basis polynomials is at most 2|Ψ|+ |Y |.
Each Lagrange basis polynomials has degree at most |CR|. Thus, for each instance, the
cost of computing the coefficients is at most (2|Ψ|+ |Y |) · |CR| · g/β, where g is the cost
of addition over the field F. As in Zaatar [10], we omit the addition cost.
When the prover issues the PCP responses, he needs to respond to not only queries for
piW and piH , but also queries for pi
(i)
A , pi
(i)
B , pi
(i)
C , (i = 0, 1, · · · ,m) and piD. The cost for the
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former is (h+1)·(|WR|+|CR|)+ρ·(3|WR|+|CR|)·f+ρlin ·3·(|WR|+|CR|)·ρ·f . Given that
the length of the latter is |CR| and these responses do not depend on underlying circuit
or the proof vector piW , the cost to compute the responses for the latter can be amortized
into all instances of the same circuit size. This cost is [h+ ρ · (3m+ 4) · f ] · |CR|/(β · γ).
The comparison in terms of the prover’s cost is in Table 5.7. We also use the com-
putation example in Section 5.5.1 to demonstrate the improvement. For any M > 100,
RIVER’s non-amortized cost of the prover is almost the same as that of Zaatar. We
demonstrate the results using M = 10000. Although RIVER introduces amortized cost,
it becomes negligible since it can be amortized into all instances of the same circuit size.
5.6 Conclusions
The state-of-the-art designs such as Pepper/Ginger/Zaatar combine a commitment
protocol to a linear PCP, achieving breakthroughs in verifiable computation. However,
the high computation, communication and storage costs still keep general verifiable
computation away from practicality. In this chapter, we presented a new verifiable-
computation protocol called RIVER. We show that RIVER reduces the amortized com-
putational costs of the verifier. Namely, the number of batched instances of the protocol,
required for amortization, will largely decrease. RIVER introduces a negligible increase
in the prover’s costs. Specifically, the increased amortized cost can be amortized over
instances of different circuits of the same size. Thus, this part can be done only once,
but used for all possible verifications.
In addition, for the first time in the context of verifiable computation, we address the
problem of reducing the informational costs. RIVER removes the requirement that the
verifier has to access the circuit description during query generating. Furthermore, this
feature of RIVER can be viewed as a first step towards applying QAP-based arguments
to the secure outsourcing of verification.
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Table 5.6 Comparison of Cost for Verifier in Each Instance
Ginger Zaatar RIVER
Setup: Commit |WG| · e/(β · γ) (|WZ | + |CZ |) · e/(β · γ) (|WR|+ |CR|) · e/(β · γ) + (fdiv +
5f) · |CR|/(β · γ)
Linearity Query Genera-
tion
ρ · ρlin · 2 · (|CG| + |CG|2) ·
c/(β · γ)
ρ · ρlin · 2 · (|WZ |+ |CZ |) · c/(β · γ) ρ · ρlin · 2 · (|WR|+ |CR|) · c/(β · γ)
Other PCP Query Genera-
tion
ρ · (c · |CG| + f ·K)/β ρ · [c+ (fdiv + 5f) · |CZ |+ f ·K +
3f ·K2]/β
ρ · |CR| · f/(β · γ)
Decommitment Query
Generation
ρ · L · f/β ρ·(ρlin ·3·(|WZ |+|CZ |)+(3|WZ |+
|CZ |)) · f/β
ρ·(ρlin ·3·(|WR|+|CR|)+(3|WR|+
|CR|)) · f/β
Decommitment Test d + ρ · L · f d + ρ · (ρlin · 6 + 4) · f 2d+ρ·(ρlin·6+4)·f+ρ·(3m+4)·f/β
Decision Making ρ · (|X| + |Y |) · f ρ · (3|X| + 3|Y |) · f ρ · (2|X| + |Y |) · f
Total non-amortized cost d + ρ · (L + |X| + |Y |) · f 2d+ρ ·f · (3|X|+3|Y |+ρlin ·6+4) 2d+ ρ · f · (2|X|+ |Y |+ ρlin · 6 + 4)
Total amortized cost |WG| · e/(β · γ) + ρ · ρlin · 2 ·
(|CG|+ |CG|2) · c/(β ·γ)+ρ ·
c · |CG|/β + ρ · (L+K) · f/β
(|WZ |+ |CZ |) · e/(β · γ) + ρ · ρlin ·
2 · (|WZ |+ |CZ |) · c/(β ·γ) + ρ · [c+
(fdiv) · |CZ |]/β+ (ρlin ·3 · (|WZ |+
|CZ |)+(3|WZ |+6|CZ |+K+3K2))·
ρ · f/β
(|WR|+ |CR|) ·e/(β ·γ)+ρ ·ρlin ·2 ·
(|WR|+ |CR|) · c/(β · γ) + (ρlin · 3 ·
(|WR|+ |CR|) + (3|WR|+ |CR|) +
3m + 4) · ρ · f/β + ((fdiv + 5f) ·
|CR| + ρ · |CR| · f)/(β · γ)
CG: set of constraints in Ginger |WG|: number of variables in the constraints (excluding inputs
and outputs) in Ginger
CZ : set of constraints in Zaatar |WZ |: number of variables in the constraints (excluding inputs
and outputs) in Zaatar
CR: set of constraints in our design |WR|: number of variables in the constraints (excluding inputs
and outputs) in our design
|X|: number of input |Y |: number of output
g: cost of addition over F L: number of PCP queries in Ginger
β: number of batching γ: number of circuits of the same size.
ρ: number of iteration of verification for one instance ρlin: number of iterations of linearity tests in one iteration of
verification.
fdiv : cost of division over F f : cost of multiplication over F
c: cost of pseudorandomly generating an element in F
d: cost of decryption over F e: cost of encryption over F
K: number of additive terms in the constraints of Ginger K2: number of distinct additive degree-2 terms in the con-
straints of Ginger
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Table 5.7 Comparison of Cost for Prover in Each Instance
Ginger Zaatar RIVER
Construct
proof
T + f · |WG|2 T+3f ·|CZ |·log2|CZ | T + 3f · |CR| · log2|CR|
32s + 3.2× 109s 32s + 3.2× 104s 32s + 3.2× 104s
Issue PCP re-
sponses
(h + (ρ · L + 1) · f) ·
(|CG| + |CG|2)
(h+ (ρ · L′ + 1) · f) ·
(|CZ | + |WZ |)
(h+1)·(|WR|+|CR|)+ρ·(3|WR|+|CR|)·f+ρlin ·3·
(|WR|+|CR|)·ρ·f+[h+ρ·(3m+4)·f ]·|CR|/(β · γ)
2.9× 1012s 5.78× 104s 5.79× 104s + 7.7×1010(β·γ) s
T : cost of computing the task h: cost of ciphertext add plus multiply
L = 3ρlin + 2: number of (high order) PCP queries in Ginger
L′ = 6ρlin + 4: number of PCP queries in Zaatar
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CHAPTER 6. BLOCK PROGRAMS: IMPROVING
EFFICIENCY OF VERIFIABLE COMPUTATION FOR
CIRCUITS WITH REPEATED SUBSTRUCTURES
6.1 Problem Statement
If viewing cloud computing from the high-level perspective, two parties are involved:
the client V , who is computationally weak, has computation tasks to be delegated to
the cloud; the cloud server P , who is computationally powerful, provides computing ser-
vices to the client. After receiving the computation task, P performs the computation
and returns the results to V . Later, V runs the verification protocol with P to ensure
the correctness of the returned result. The computation task is a piece of code writ-
ten in a high-level programming language. In the verification stage, this piece of code
is transformed into an arithmetic circuit form. Existing compilers can turn high-level
programs into (non-deterministic) circuits [9, 10, 14]. Since this phase is outside the
scope of the current chapter, we directly assume the computation task is formalized into
an arithmetic circuit in the verification stage. We assume this piece of code is a loop
program and in the verification stage, this program is formalized into a loop circuit (we
will further illustrate loop circuits in Section 6.3).
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6.2 Our Theoretical Results: Block Programs (BPs)
Just as QSPs are a natural extension of span programs (SPs) [62], our new form of
arithmetization which we call Block Programs (BPs), is a natural extension of Quadratic
Arithmetic Programs (QAPs). We focus on a kind of general circuits, which may be
an arithmetic circuit or a boolean circuit, that is composed of identical units. This
elementary unit, which we call block, can be a simple NAND gate. But it is more
common to be a more complex sub-circuit. This kind of sub-circuit can be multiple-
input-multiple-output. The sub-circuits can be viewed as pseudo-gates, a generalized
form of gates. Consider a scenario where the whole circuit is composed of this kind
of sub-circuits just like in Figure 6.1, where all blocks are identical. We define BPs as
follows.
Definition 2. (Block Programs)(BPs, Generalization of Quadratic Arithmetic Programs
(QAPs) [13])
We assume that a circuit computing a function Ψ : FN 7→ FN ′ is composed of identical
blocks, all of which compute the same function: ψ : FV 7→ FM . (ψ implies M functions
ψj : FV 7→ F where j = 1, 2, · · · ,M . Each of these M functions is associated to one of
the outputs of ψ.)
A BP Q over field F contains V sets of W polynomials: {A1w(t)}, {A2w(t)}, · · · ,
{AV w(t)}, and M sets of W polynomials : {B1w(t)}, {B2w(t)}, · · · , {BMw(t)}, for
w ∈ {1, · · · ,W}, and a target polynomial D(t). We say Q computes Ψ using block ψ if
the following holds:
(z1, z2, · · · , zN+N ′) ∈ FN+N ′ is a valid assignment of Ψ’s inputs and outputs, if
and only if there exist coefficients zN+N ′+1, · · · , zW such that D(t) divides Pj(t), (j =
1, · · · ,M), where
Pj(t) = ψj
(
W∑
w=1
zw · A1w(t), · · · ,
W∑
w=1
zw · AV w(t)
)
− [
W∑
w=1
zw ·Bjw(t)]. (6.2.1)
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Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6
Z7 Z8 Z9 Z10
Z11 Z12 Z13 Z14
Block No.1 Block No.2
Block No.3 Block No.4
Figure 6.1 Computing through Blocks
Meaning Range
v Index of Input of a Block 1, · · · , V
j Index of Output of a Block 1, · · · ,M
k Index of Blocks 1, · · · ,K
w Index of wires connecting blocks in
the circuit
1, · · · ,W
w1 w is represented as (w1, w2) 1, · · · ,M +Q
w2 w is represented as (w1, w2) 1, · · · ,K
N the number of inputs of the circuit
N ′ the number of outputs of the cir-
cuit
i Index of Direct Input of a Block 1, · · · ,M
u Index of Extra Input of a Block 1, · · · , Q
Figure 6.2 Notations
71
In other words, for each j, there exists a polynomial Hj(t) such that D(t) ·Hj(t) = Pj(t),
where j = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
After we define Block Programs, two natural questions are: (1) do such Block Pro-
grams exist? (2) if yes, how to construct Block Programs? Here, we will show the
existence of Block Programs by constructing corresponding BPs by polynomial inter-
polation. In particular, given a circuit that computes Ψ and is composed of identical
blocks denoted by ψ : FV 7→ FM as above, we firstly construct a group of interpolation
polynomials in Lagrange form. Then, we prove that the constructed polynomials form
the BP that computes Ψ.
Suppose the circuit is composed of K blocks. We pick an arbitrary value σk for each
block. When we pick these K values from F, we make sure all these values are different
from each other. We define the target polynomial as follows: D(t) =
∏K
k=1(t − σk).
Now we consider the set of all the inputs of the circuit, and all the outputs of each
block. Firstly, we label each input of the whole circuit and each output from a block
with an index w, where w ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,W} and W is the total number of all wires,
namely, all the inputs of the whole circuit and all the outputs of each block. We can
easily deduce that W = N + K · M . (Recall that N is the number of inputs to the
whole circuit, K is the number of blocks, and M is the number of outputs from a block)
Then the values of each input of the whole circuit and each output from a block can
be denoted by zw. Secondly, we assign V + M interpolation polynomials in Lagrange
form to each wire, indicating whether the corresponding value zw is the v-th input,
or the j-th output of each block, where v = 1, 2, · · · , V and j = 1, 2, · · · ,M . These
polynomials indeed determine how these blocks are interconnected. Thus, the resulting
set of polynomials is a complete description of the original circuit. Specifically, we let
the polynomials {Avw(t)} (for w = 1, 2, · · · ,W ) encode the v-th input into each block,
where v = 1, 2, · · · , V and let {Bjw(t)} (for w = 1, 2, · · · ,W ) encode the j-th output
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from each block, where j = 1, 2, · · · ,M . In particular, we let
Avw(σk) =

1 if zw is the v-th input to the k-th block;
0 otherwise.
(6.2.2)
Bjw(σk) =

1 if zw is the j-th output from the k-th block;
0 otherwise.
(6.2.3)
Based on the evaluations at the K values σ1, · · · , σK , it is straightforward to construct
{Avw(t)} and {Bjw(t)}, for w = 1, · · · ,W , v = 1, · · · , V , and j = 1, · · · ,M using inter-
polation polynomials in Lagrange form. Let K be the set of indices: K = {1, 2, · · · , K}.
Then,
Avw(t) =
∑
k∈K
Avw(σk) ·
∏
k∗∈K,k∗ 6=k
(t− σk∗)∏
k∗∈K,k∗ 6=k
(σk − σk∗) , (6.2.4)
and
Bjw(t) =
∑
k∈K
Bjw(σk) ·
∏
k∗∈K,k∗ 6=k
(t− σk∗)∏
k∗∈K,k∗ 6=k
(σk − σk∗) . (6.2.5)
We can show that {Avw(t)} and {Bjw(t)}, which we have constructed using in-
terpolation polynomials in Lagrange form, constitute a BP that computes Ψ, where
w = 1, 2, · · · ,W , v = 1, 2, · · · , V , and j = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
Theorem 17. For a circuit which computes a function Ψ : FN 7→ FN ′, if the circuit is
composed of identical blocks denoted by ψ : FV 7→ FM , then {Avw(t)} and {Bjw(t)} con-
structed above constitute a BP that compute Ψ, where w = 1, 2, · · · ,W , v = 1, 2, · · · , V ,
and j = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
Proof. The rough idea of the proof is as follows. If we evaluate {Avw(t)} and {Bjw(t)}
in σk, for w = 1, 2, · · · ,W , v = 1, 2, · · · , V , and j = 1, 2, · · · ,M , which we have con-
structed, we can observe that this makes the equation (6.2.1) become:
Pj(σk) = ψj(the kth block’s inputs)− (the kth block’s output). (6.2.6)
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This means that if the output is correct, then Pj(σk) = 0. Namely, σk is a root of Pj(t),
which in turn means that (t − σk) divides Pj(t), which sets up the divisibility by D(t).
The rigorous proof is in Section 6.5.1.
Here, we give a concrete example to demonstrate how we build the BPs for the circuit
in Figure 6.1.
Let us take the circuit in Figure 6.1 as a concrete example to demonstrate how we
build the corresponding BPs. The corresponding BP is demonstrated in Table 6.1. The
polynomials are determined by the evaluations at the four values σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4 (this tuple
is denoted by Σ in Table 6.1), which are associated with the four blocks. First, given that
there are four blocks, we select four distinct values: σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4 ∈ F, each associated
with the corresponding block. The number of blocks also implies the degree of the BP:
four. Given that each block has three inputs and two outputs, the BP has five sets
of polynomials. We take the circuit’s input/output wires and all the blocks’ output
wires into account. Given the number of these wires is fourteen, each set has fourteen
polynomials. Second, we construct these polynomials based on each wires contributions
to the blocks, according to the interconnection of the blocks in the circuit schematic.
More specifically, for v = 1, 2, 3, w = 1, 2, · · · , 14, and k = 1, 2, 3, 4, we let Avw(σk) =
1 if zw is the v-th input to the k-th block, and Avw(σk) = 0 otherwise; we also let
Bjw(σk) = 1 if zw is the j-th output from the k-th block, and Bjw(σk) = 0 otherwise.
For instance, since Z11 is the first input to both Block No.3 and Block No.4, A1,11(σ3) = 1
and A1,11(σ4) = 1. since Z13 is the first output from Block No.2, B1,13(σ2) = 1. Hence, we
can simply generate a table of the polynomials’ evaluations at σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4 as in Table
6.1. Thirdly, we construct the polynomials using the interpolation polynomials in the
Lagrange form. For example, the evaluation of A1,1(t) at the four values σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4
are (1, 0, 0, 0). Then, we have A1,1(t) =
(t−σ2)(t−σ3)(t−σ4)
(σ1−σ2)(σ1−σ3)(σ1−σ4) . In essence, the polynomials
in the BP are defined in terms of their evaluations at the values which we pre-select for
each block.
74
Table 6.1 BP of the circuit
Σ Σ Σ Σ Σ
A1,1(t) (1, 0, 0, 0) A2,1(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A3,1(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,1(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B2,1(t) (0, 0, 0, 0)
A1,2(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,2(t) (1, 0, 0, 0) A3,2(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,2(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B2,2(t) (0, 0, 0, 0)
A1,3(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,3(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A3,3(t) (1, 0, 0, 0) B1,3(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B2,3(t) (0, 0, 0, 0)
A1,4(t) (0, 1, 0, 0) A2,4(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A3,4(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,4(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B2,4(t) (0, 0, 0, 0)
A1,5(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,5(t) (0, 1, 0, 0) A3,5(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,5(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B2,5(t) (0, 0, 0, 0)
A1,6(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,6(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A3,6(t) (0, 1, 0, 0) B1,6(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B2,6(t) (0, 0, 0, 0)
A1,7(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,7(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A3,7(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,7(t) (0, 0, 1, 0) B2,7(t) (0, 0, 0, 0)
A1,8(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,8(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A3,8(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,8(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B2,8(t) (0, 0, 1, 0)
A1,9(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,9(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A3,9(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,9(t) (0, 0, 0, 1) B2,9(t) (0, 0, 0, 0)
A1,10(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,10(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A3,10(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,10(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B2,10(t) (0, 0, 0, 1)
A1,11(t) (0, 0, 1, 1) A2,11(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A3,11(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,11(t) (1, 0, 0, 0) B2,11(t) (0, 0, 0, 0)
A1,12(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,12(t) (0, 0, 1, 0) A3,12(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,12(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B2,12(t) (1, 0, 0, 0)
A1,13(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,13(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A3,13(t) (0, 0, 1, 1) B1,13(t) (0, 1, 0, 0) B2,13(t) (0, 0, 0, 0)
A1,14(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) A2,14(t) (0, 0, 0, 1) A3,14(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B1,14(t) (0, 0, 0, 0) B2,14(t) (0, 1, 0, 0)
6.3 Our Scheme: Interactive Verification for Loops
In this section, we use the previously described Block Programs to develop the full
solution to the verification of a “loop” computation. Since the theoretical results in
Section 6.2 apply to all general circuits that have repeated substructures, which are not
limited to those circuits that a piece of “loop” code is mapped to, we are not directly
ready for designing the verification protocol for a “loop” computation. Thus, in Section
6.3.1, we further refine the theoretical results we have developed in Section 6.2, to loop-
specific results which are more appropriate for the blocks to which a piece of “loop” code
is mapped. Then, in Section 6.3.2, we demonstrate our verification protocol for “loop”
computations using Block Programs.
6.3.1 Theoretical Results for Loop Circuits
As stated in Section 6.1, the computation task is a piece of “loop” code written
in a high-level programming language. In the verification stage, this piece of code is
transformed into an arithmetic circuit form using existing compilers such as [9, 10, 14].
We call this arithmetic circuit which we map a piece of “loop” code to a loop circuit.
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Figure 6.3 A Loop Circuit
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Figure 6.4 One Single Block
It is straightforward to abstract the structure of this circuit as follows. As shown in
Figure 6.3, a loop circuit is a series of identical blocks, the output of each of which serves
as the input for the next. Each block, which is an arithmetic circuit or boolean circuit, is
actually an execution of the loop body of the original “loop” code. Meanwhile, since each
execution of the loop body may have extra inputs from the outside of the whole piece
of code, (e.g. in the big data processing scenarios) each block may have corresponding
extra inputs from the outside of the circuit. The block is demonstrated in Figure 6.4,
where EX
(2)
1 , EX
(2)
2 , · · · , EX(2)Q are the extra inputs.
In Section 6.2, we show that for a circuit that has repeated substructures there exists
a BP that computes that circuit. We have already introduced the theoretical results
that show how to construct the corresponding BP, and how to determine whether a
given inputs/outputs tuple is valid for that circuit using BPs. Since a loop circuit has
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repeated substructures, we can easily apply our previous results to loops.
Now, we consider a loop circuit as shown in Figure 6.3. The circuit’s functionality is
to compute a function Ψ : FM+K·Q 7→ FM . The circuit is composed of identical blocks as
shown in Figure 6.4, denoted by ψ : FM+Q 7→ FM . The block ψ can also be formulated
as M functions: ψj : FM+Q 7→ F, for j = 1, 2, · · · ,M . By Theorem 17, we can construct
a BP Q that computes Ψ, where Q consists of a target polynomial D(t), M + Q sets
of K · (M + Q) + M polynomials (See Figure 6.2 for notations): {A1,w(t)}, {A2,w(t)},
· · · , {AM,w(t)}, and M sets of K · (M +Q) +M polynomials: {B1,w(t)}, {B2,w(t)}, · · · ,
{BM,w(t)}, where w is the index which represents the labels of wires and K ·(M+Q)+M
is the number of the wires.
Since a “loop” circuit has a regular structure, we label the wires with a pair of indices
and get explicit expressions of the corresponding Block Programs. Then we can simplify
these Block Programs into succinct expressions denoted by Ak(t), k = 1, 2, · · ·K. Namely,
we let w be (w1, w2) and denote each wire by Zw1,w2 as shown in Figure 6.3. Correspond-
ingly, each polynomial in Q is denoted by {Av,(w1,w2)(t)} or {Bj,(w1,w2)(t)} where v, w1 ∈
{1, 2, · · · ,M,M + 1, · · · ,M + Q}, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, and w2 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K + 1}. The
explicit expressions of Q are as follows: Let K be the set of indices, K = {1, 2, · · · , K}.
If σ1, σ2, · · · , σK are distinct values, each of which is picked from F, then,
Av,(w1,w2)(t) =
∑
k∈K
Av,(w1,w2)(σk) ·
∏
k∗∈K,k∗ 6=k
(t− σk∗)∏
k∗∈K,k∗ 6=k
(σk − σk∗) (6.3.1)
and
Bj,(w1,w2)(t) =
∑
k∈K
Bj,(w1,w2)(σk) ·
∏
k∗∈K,k∗ 6=k
(t− σk∗)∏
k∗∈K,k∗ 6=k
(σk − σk∗) , (6.3.2)
where Av,(w1,w2)(σk) and Bj,(w1,w2)(σk) are determined by the interconnection of the blocks
in the circuit: Av,(w1,w2)(σk) is 1 if Zw1,w2 is the v-th input of the k-th block and 0 oth-
erwise; Bj,(w1,w2)(σk) is 1 if Zw1,w2 is the j-th output from the k-th block and 0 other-
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wise. From the circuit’s structure, we can simplify above as follows: Av,(w1,w2)(σk) is 1 if
w1 = v, w2 = k and 0 otherwise; Bj,(w1,w2)(σk) is 1 if w1 = j, w2 = k+ 1 and 0 otherwise.
Thus,
Av,(w1,w2)(t) =

Q
k∈K,k 6=w2
(t−σk)Q
k∈K,k 6=w2
(σw2−σk)
if w1=v,and1≤w2≤K,
0 otherwise
. (6.3.3)
Bj,(w1,w2)(t) =

Q
k∈K,k 6=w2−1
(t−σk)Q
k∈K,k 6=w2−1
(σ(w2−1)−σk)
if w1=j, and2≤w2≤K+1,
0 otherwise
. (6.3.4)
If we define
Ak(t) =
∏
k′∈K,k′ 6=k
(t− σk′)∏
k′∈K,k′ 6=k
(σk − σk′) (6.3.5)
then, the block program can be expressed by Ak(t) where k = 1, 2, · · · , K:
Av,(w1,w2)(t) =

Aw2(t) if w1 = v, 1 ≤ w2 ≤ K
0 otherwise.
(6.3.6)
Bj,(w1,w2)(t) =

Aw2−1(t) if w1 = j, 2 ≤ w2 ≤ K + 1
0 otherwise.
(6.3.7)
If we express the corresponding Block Programs by these Ak(t), instantiate the wire
values, and plug them into Definition 2, we directly have the following result for loop
circuits.
Corollary 18. We consider a loop circuit which computes a function Ψ : FM+K·Q 7→ FM .
As in Figure 6.3, this loop circuit is composed of successive blocks which are identical
and denoted by ψ : FM+Q 7→ FM . Naturally, the block can be formulated as M functions:
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ψj : FM+Q 7→ F, j = 1, 2, · · · ,M . Let Q be the block program that computes Ψ using
block ψ. Then, for inputs (Z1,1, Z2,1, · · · , ZM,1) ∈ FM and the extra inputs ZM+1,1, ZM+2,1,
· · · , ZM+Q,1, · · · , ZM+1,K, ZM+2,K, · · · , ZM+Q,K, all of which are in F, the corresponding
outputs of the circuit are (Z1,K+1, Z2,K+1, · · · , ZM,K+1) ∈ FM , iff there exist coefficients
(they are actually the inner wire values) (Z1,2, · · · , ZM,2) ∈ FM , (Z1,3, · · · , ZM,3) ∈ FM ,
· · · , (Z1,K , · · · , ZM,K) ∈ FM such that D(t) divides Pj(t) (j = 1, 2, · · · ,M) where
Pj(t) =ψj
( K∑
k=1
Z1,k · Ak(t), · · · ,
K∑
k=1
ZM,k · Ak(t),
K∑
k=1
ZM+1,k · Ak(t), · · · ,
K∑
k=1
ZM+Q,k · Ak(t)
)
−
(
K∑
k=1
Zj,k+1 · Ak(t)
)
. (6.3.8)
In other words, there exists a polynomial Hj(t) for each Pj(t) (j = 1, 2, · · · ,M), such
that D(t) ·Hj(t) = Pj(t).
Proof. Since the loop circuit is a circuit which is composed of identical blocks, by Def-
inition 2, for the purported intermediate wire values (Z1,2,· · · ,ZM,2), (Z1,3,· · · ,ZM,3), · · · ,
(Z1,K ,· · · ,ZM,K), it suffices to prove (6.3.8) is equivalent to (6.2.1) in the context of loop
circuits. In the context of loop circuits, (6.2.1) is:
Pj(t) =ψj
(M+Q∑
w1=1
K+1∑
w2=1
Zw1,w2 · A1,(w1,w2)(t), · · · ,
M+Q∑
w1=1
K+1∑
w2=1
Zw1,w2 · AM+Q,(w1,w2)(t)
)
−
(
M+Q∑
w1=1
K+1∑
w2=1
Zw1,w2 ·Bj,(w1,w2)(t)
)
. (6.3.9)
If we instantiate Av,(w1,w2)(t), Bj,(w1,w2)(t) using (6.3.6) and (6.3.7), we immediately get
(6.3.8). The conclusion follows.
6.3.2 Our Interactive Verification for Loops
Corollary 18 implies a way to verify a result computed by a “loop” circuit using
BPs. To convince V that the result is correct, by the Corollary 18, it suffices to show
the existence of those intermediate results and the polynomial Hj(t) which satisfy the
divisibility D(t) ·Hj(t) = Pj(t).
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The divisibility itself can be checked probabilistically: for polynomials Pj(t), Hj(t)
and D(t), V randomly picks τ ∈ F and checks whether D(τ) · Hj(τ) = Pj(τ). (We will
show how to evaluate D(τ), Hj(τ) and Pj(τ) later.) If the result is correct, P must be
able to find Hj(t) such that Pj(t) = Hj(t)·D(t), then for any τ ∈ F, D(τ)·Hj(τ) = Pj(τ).
If the result is not correct, then for any Hj(t), D(τ) ·Hj(τ) 6= Pj(τ) except with a small
probability.
To check the existence of the intermediate results and the polynomial Hj(t), one naive
idea is to let P output the intermediate results and Hj(t), and let V evaluate Hj(τ) and
use the intermediate results to check the divisibility. Instead of this expensive approach,
we use a “commit and query” method. Roughly speaking, we have P commit to the
intermediate results and Hj(t) first. Then, when V needs to use the intermediate results
and Hj(τ), he will query P to get purported values and finally check the divisibility. (We
will show the “commit and query” method in details later.)
Now we show how we evaluate D(τ), Hj(τ) and Pj(τ). For D(τ), V can construct
D(t) himself and evaluate D(τ) himself. In our protocol, neither V nor P will materialize
Pj(τ). Pj(t) involves three sets of polynomials: the polynomials that abstract the outputs
of the blocks: Gj(t) =
∑K
k=1 Zj,k+1 · Ak(t), j = 1, 2 · · ·M ; the polynomials that abstract
the inputs of the blocks: fINi(t) =
∑K
k=1 Zi,k · Ak(t), i = 1, 2 · · ·M ; and the polynomials
that abstract the extra inputs of the blocks: fEXu(t) =
∑K
k=1 EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+u · Ak(t), u =
1, 2, · · · , Q, where EX(1)(k−1)·Q+u = Zu+M,k. V can construct fEXu(t) and evaluate fEXu(τ)
himself. We observe that Gj(t) and fINi(t) are the only parts in the divisibility equation
(6.3.8) that involve the intermediate results. When evaluating them, neither V nor P
genuinely materializes the polynomial. We view Gj(t), fINi(t) and Hj(t) to be linear
functions, denoted by piGj (j = 1, · · · ,M), piINi (i = 1, · · · ,M), piHj (j = 1, · · · ,M),
respectively. We have P commit to them first1, then have V evaluate these polynomials
through querying P on these committed functions, as in [8, 9, 10]. More specifically,
1Since the commit/decommit and corresponding linearity tests are mature techniques as in [8, 9, 10],
we omit the details here
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as a PCP style protocol, in our protocol, P holds a proof l and V holds a query q.
When queried with q, P responds with the evaluation of the linear function pi(q) =
〈l, q〉 (where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product of two vectors), which should be the evaluation
of l(t) at the point t = τ . For example, if l represents the coefficient vector of the
polynomial l(t) and q = (1, τ, τ 2, · · · , ), then pi(q) is l(τ). To evaluate Gj(τ), V queries
P with: qG = (A1(τ), A2(τ) · · · , AK−1(τ)). To evaluate fINi(τ), V queries P with: qIN =
(A2(τ), A3(τ) · · · , AK(τ)). To evaluate Hj(τ), V queries P with: qH = (1, τ, τ 2, · · · ).
The length of qH is equal to the highest degree of all Hj(t) (j = 1, · · ·M).
So far we have demonstrated all the techniques we will use. Now we show our interac-
tive verification protocol as in Figure 6.5. Note that before verification, V sends the loop
program and (Z1,1, Z2,1, · · · , ZM,1) (ZM+1,1, · · · , ZM+Q,1) · · · (ZM+1,K , ZM+2,K , · · · , ZM+Q,K)
to P ; on these inputs P computes and returns the results: (Z1,K+1, · · · , ZM,K+1). Our
idea is to prove that the wire values between repeated substructures are calculated cor-
rectly, and then prove that the blocks themselves are computed correctly, rather than
trying to verify the entire circuit in one round. Let the loop circuit contain K executions
of the loop body. We view the whole circuit from a two-layer perspective. In the first
layer’s perspective, the circuit consists of one big block, which we call the first layer block
and denote by a function ψ(1) : FM+K·Q 7→ FM . In the second layer’s perspective, the
circuit consists of K smaller blocks, which we call the second layer block and denote by
a function ψ(2) : FM+K·Q/K 7→ FM . Each of the second layer block is one execution of
the loop body. We reduce the task of verifying (for j = 1, 2, · · · ,M)
OUT
(1)
j =ψ
(1)
j (IN
(1)
1 , · · · , IN(1)M , EX(1)1 , · · · , EX(1)Q·K), (6.3.10)
to the task of verifying (for j = 1, 2, · · · ,M)
OUT
(2)
j = ψ
(2)
j (IN
(2)
1 , · · · , IN(2)M , EX(2)1 , · · · , EX(2)Q ), (6.3.11)
(where IN
(1)
1 , · · · , IN(1)M and EX(1)1 , · · · , EX(1)Q·K are respectively the inputs and the extra
inputs to the loop circuit, and OUT
(1)
1 , · · · , OUT(1)M are the outputs from the loop circuit, as
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Setup
Step 1: V randomly generates τ ∈ F and qH = (1, τ, τ2, · · · , τV ), qG = (A1(τ), A2(τ) · · · , AK−1(τ)), qIN =
(A2(τ), A3(τ) · · · , AK(τ))
Step 2: V generates the commitment query according to the commitment protocol as in Pepper [8], and sends it to
P;
Step 3: V generates σ1, · · · , σK and constructs the BP for the circuit.
Verification
Step 4: Both P and V computes IN(1)i , EX(1)(k−1)·Q+u, and OUT
(1)
j : IN
(1)
i ← Zi,1, (i = 1, 2, · · · ,M) ;
EX
(1)
(k−1)·Q+u ← Zu+M,k, where u = 1, 2 · · ·Q and k = 1, 2, · · · ,K; OUT
(1)
j ← Zj,K+1, (j = 1, 2, · · · ,M)
Step 5: P computes intermediate results Zw1,w2 , linear functions piHj , piGj , piINi for all i, j, replies the commitment
information for all proofs.
Step 6: V sends P these queries: qH , qG, qIN ,P replies: piHj (qH), piGj (qG), piINi (qIN ) (i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M})
Step 7: V checks the linearity of these proofs. If any fails, reject;
Step 8: P sends OUT(2)j ; V checks whether OUT(2)j = D(τ) ·piHj (qH) +piGj (qG) +AK(τ) · OUT(1)j , where j = 1, · · · ,M .
If not, reject.
Step 9: V updates IN(2)i , i = 1, 2, · · · ,M : IN(2)i = piINi (qIN ) + IN(1)i · A1(τ); and updates EX(2)u by computing:
EX
(2)
u ← fEXu (τ) (u = 1, 2, · · · , Q).
Step 10: P convinces V that OUT(2)j = ψ(2)j (IN(2)1 , · · · , IN(2)M , EX
(2)
1 , · · · , EX(2)Q )
Step 11: V performs the decommitment check for every proofs. If any fails, V rejects.
Step 12: If the running of our protocol goes here, accept.
Figure 6.5 Our Verification Protocol
in Figure 6.3; IN
(2)
1 , · · · , IN(2)M and EX(2)1 , · · · , EX(2)Q are respectively the inputs and extra
inputs to one loop body, and OUT
(2)
1 , · · · , OUT(2)M are the outputs from that loop body.
See Figure 6.4). To verify (6.3.11), V can compute itself, or let P perform some other
verification protocols like Pinocchio [14], Zaatar [10], etc. We omit the details here.
6.3.3 Security Analysis
Now, we provide the completeness and soundness of our design.
Theorem 19. (Completeness) As in Figure 6.3, for the inputs (Z1,1, Z2,1, · · · , ZM,1),
(ZM+1,1, ZM+2,1, · · · , ZM+Q,1), · · · , (ZM+1,K , ZM+2,K , · · · , ZM+Q,K), and (P ,V) run the
protocol in Figure 6.5. If the results (Z1,K+1, Z2,K+1, · · · , ZM,K+1) are correct, then we
have: Pr{V accepts} = 1.
To prove the completeness(Theorem 19), the idea is to show that an honest prover
is able to provide the correct proof associated with the correct results. This correct
proof will pass all the checks with probability 1. This is straightforward and we omit the
details here. The complete proof is provided in Section 6.5.3.
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Theorem 20. (Soundness) As in Figure 6.3, assume the inputs are (Z1,1, Z2,1, · · · , ZM,1),
(ZM+1,1, ZM+2,1, · · · , ZM+Q,1), · · · , (ZM+1,K , ZM+2,K , · · · , ZM+Q,K), and P and V proceed
according to Figure 6.5.
There exists a constant κ < 1 such that if results (Z1,K+1, Z2,K+1, · · · , ZM,K+1) are not
correct, then Pr{V accepts} < κ holds for any purported proofs. The probability is over
the randomness of both V and P in both phases in our protocol. This is equivalent to: if
Pr{V accepts} > κ, the purported results are correct.
The proof of the soundness is in Section 6.5.2.
6.3.4 Improving the Performance through Batching
One question left over is whether, if V queries different linear proofs, he should re-
generate the queries for each proof. If so, the cost of issuing queries will be prohibitive.
Our idea is to reuse τ and corresponding divisibility query for all linear proofs. We
achieve this by making our protocol work in a batching style, which implies two levels:
(1) same queries work over many computation instances, namely V verifies computation
in batches; (2) for one computation instance, V uses the same τ and corresponding
queries for all proofs in the same layer.
This batching technique was firstly proposed in [8], where V generates one single
commitment query Enc(r)(the query to get the commitment information) and one single
set of PCP queries for β proofs. In the commitment phase, P replies to V with β
pieces of commitment information Enc(s1), Enc(s2), · · · , Enc(sβ), one for each of the β
proofs. In the decommitment phase, V issues the decommitment query based on the
commitment query Enc(r) and the set of PCP queries and receives β answers, one for
each of the β proofs. V will perform the decommitment check separately. It is proved that
this batching technique will not impair the soundness of the verification protocol ([8],
Appendix C, Theorem C.1). This immediately implies the correctness and soundness of
our first level “batching”, as that in [10].
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For the second level of “batching”, we are targeting to use one single commitment
query and one single set of PCP queries for all these proofs. Firstly, we notice that
the bottom line of batching is that P is not allowed to output the answer for one proof
after he learns whether V accepts or rejects another proof (the so-called Verifier Rejection
Problem [58]) Thus, we move all the decommitment tests to the last step in our protocol,
which is performed after all verification is done. Secondly, since our protocol is an
interactive protocol, the soundness holds only under the restriction that V ’s τ and his
verdict in each layer does not help P deviate from the protocol and generate proofs in
the next layer to cheat V . Thus, if we use Zaatar [10] to verify the loop body, we need to
guarantee that the randomly generated number for the divisibility test in Zaatar should
be different from our τ .
6.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the performance of our design and compare it with existing
work. We firstly compare the complexity of the algorithms. Then, we compare the
“experimental results” of our design with all existing work. However, we model, rather
than measure, their performance. For our design, we built a model of our design’s
performance based on the latest performance results for [10], while for the others, we
used previously published models [10, 14].
6.4.1 Performance Analysis and Comparison
We are targeting at reducing the amortized part of cost (for the verifier) and the proof
generation cost (for the prover). Now, in the context of loop circuits, we compare the
cost of our protocol with Zaatar and Pinocchio as in Figure 6.6. We use the published
performance models of Zaatar [10] and Pinocchio [14]. For Pinocchio, we only list the
most burdensome part in Figure 6.6; for Zaatar, given that Zaatar’s circuit is formulated
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into constraints, we view the number of constraints in Zaatar as the number of multipli-
cation gates (circuit size). Then, the number of variables in the constraints (excluding
inputs and outputs) in Zaatar equals the circuit size minus the number of input/output
wires.
Remember that our verification design has two layers, the first layer proves that the
wire values between repeated substructures are calculated correctly, and then the second
layer proves that the blocks themselves are computed correctly. At the second layer in
our protocol, the result of a single execution of the loop body needs to be verified. We use
existing methods as a building block to perform the verification. In Figure 6.6, the last
terms in the column of our design’s cost model (e.g., CZna(1),
1
K
CZa (K), etc.) represent
the cost for the verification of the loop body in our protocol. In our protocol, if V adopts
Zaatar or Pinocchio as the verification block for the loop body, this part of cost will
usually be only 1
K
of the total cost that V pays if V uses Zaatar or Pinocchio to verify
the whole loop. In particular, the second layer verification(verification of the loop body)
also contains amortized cost, which is linear in the size of the circuit associated with the
loop body. For simplicity, We choose Zaatar to show our cost model.
Now we show why the amortized cost in our protocol is much less that its counterparts
in all existing protocols: our design has the following properties: First, it has more
flexibility in amortizing. Our protocol has a benefit that the first part of amortized cost,
denoted by C∗a , can be amortized over instances which have the same loop structure and
the same degree of the polynomial that the loop body computes. (Notice: these instances
can have different circuits for the loop body, as long as the circuit the loop bodies compute
have the same degree.) This property renders our protocol superior to existing works, in
which costs can only be amortized to instances that share the same circuit. Namely, even
if our amortized cost is the same as its counterparts, our protocol can be amortized to
more instances than other protocols. Second, it has smaller costs. Even if the amortized
part for verifying the loop body, denoted by C†a, counteracts a part of cost, the total
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Zaatar (Loop ver. ) Pinocchio (Loop ver.) Our Algma
V’s Total non-
amortized cost
CZna(K) = 2Dec+ρ · (6M+
3Q ·K + 6ρlin + 4) · Mult
CPna = 11Map Cna(K) = 3M · Dec + ρ ·
(6M + Q · K + 9Mρlin) ·
Mult + CZna(1)
V’s Total amor-
tized cost
CZa (K) = (2K ·C) ·Enc+ρ ·
ρlin · 2 · (2K ·C) · Rand+ ρ ·
[Rand+(Div)·K ·C]+(ρlin ·
3 · (2K ·C) + (3K ·C+ 6K ·
C +K1 + 3K2)) · ρ · Mult
CPa (K) = [10(K · C)] ·
Exp
Ca(K) = (K · D) · [Enc +
2ρ ·ρlin ·(Rand+Mult)+2ρ ·
Mult] + ρ · (Div + 3 · Mult) ·
K + 1
K
CZa (K)
Task Computing Comp Comp Comp
P : Construct
proof vector
CZp (K) = 3Mult · (K · C) ·
log2(K · C)
CPp (K) = 8Muex · (K ·
C)
Cp(K) = 3Mult · (K · D −
K)·log2(K ·D−K)+CZp (1)
P : Issue PCP re-
sponses
CZi (K) = (Oper + (ρ ·
(6ρlin+4)+1) ·Mult) ·(2K ·
C)
N/A Ci(K) = [Oper + (ρ ·
(3ρlin + 2) ·M + 1) · Mult] ·
(K ·D) + CZi (1)
Map: cost of bilinear map in G× G 7→ GT Exp: cost of exponential operation in G
Div: cost of division over F Mult: cost of multiplication over F
Rand: cost of pseudorandomly generating an element
in F
Q: number of the extra input of the loop body
Dec: cost of decryption over F Enc: cost of encryption over F
Comp: cost of evaluating the whole circuit Oper: cost of ciphertext add plus multiply
Muex: cost of multiplication over exponent
ρ: number of iteration of verification for one instance ρlin: number of iterations of linearity tests in one
iteration of verification.
K1: number of additive terms in the constraints of
Ginger, Zaatar’s underlying protocol
K2: number of distinct additive degree-2 terms
in the constraints of Ginger, Zaatar’s underlying
protocol
K: number of executions of the loop body M : the number of input (or output) of the loop
body
D: degree of the polynomial that the loop body com-
putes
C: size of the circuit of the loop body
aNote: the costs of our design are calculated in Section 6.6.1, 6.6.2, and 6.6.3.
Figure 6.6 Comparison of Costs in Each Instance
amortized cost in our protocol is still far less than that of Zaatar in the loop circuit.
Notice the total amortized cost in our protocol is [C∗a + C
†
a] ∼ [O(K · D) + O(C)].
Zaatar has amortized cost which is linear in the size of the whole circuit, denoted by
CZa ∼ O(K · C). Recall that K is the number of executions of the loop body and D is
the degree of the polynomial that the loop body computes. (The loop body is equivalent
to an arithmetic circuit and the arithmetic circuit computes a polynomial.) C is the size
of the circuit that the loop body is equivalent to. We can prove that the amortized cost
in our protocol is usually far less than the amortized cost in existing work.
Although C∗a and C
Z
a seems similar, in general, they are largely different. We know
arithmetic circuits are the standard model for computing polynomials. In other words,
an output of an arithmetic circuit is a polynomial in the input variables. The arithmetic
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complexity is characterized by the size of the arithmetic circuit. From the theory of
arithmetic circuit complexity, we know most polynomials have high arithmetic complex-
ity ([63], Section 4). More specifically, a detailed analysis using a counting argument
shows that most polynomials in n variables and degree d require circuits of size at least
Ω(
√(
n+d
d
)
) ([64], Section 3.1). Here most means that the number of polynomials that
have small circuits (i.e. smaller than the lower bound above) is much smaller than the
total number of polynomials. In most cases, to compute an n-variate polynomial of de-
gree d requires a circuit of size at least Ω(
√(
n+d
d
)
). In our context, n = M + Q and
d = D. Then, by this lower bound, C is at least Ω(
√(
M+Q+D
D
)
) which is much more than
D, since Ω
(√(
M+Q+D
D
)) ∼ Ω(√ (M+Q+D)M+Q+D+ 12
(M+Q)M+Q+
1
2 ·DD+ 12
)
by Stirling’s approximation. For
Given M and Q, this is an exponential function of D.
Similarly, we improve the prover’s cost of proof generation from quasilinear in the
size of the loop body (like in Zaatar) to quasilinear in the degree of the loop body, with
an additional cost for generating the proof of a single execution of the loop body. This
is also a big improvement according to the analysis above.
6.4.2 An Example for Performance Comparison
To have a clear picture of these costs and how powerful our method is in verification
of real-world iterative computation, we look at a real loop. We look at an example of suc-
cessive matrix multiplication, which is widely used in communications, signal processing,
and control systems. The code to compute: xA0 · · ·AK , where x is a 1 ×K vector and
Ai, (i = 0, · · ·K) are M ×M matrices. It is easy to write this into a “for” loop. Let A
be a 1000×1000 matrix and the number of executions be K = 500. Let the width of the
inputs/outputs be M = 1000, the width of the extra inputs for each execution Q = M2,
and the circuit size of the loop body C = M2. It is easy to see the polynomial that each
loop body computes is quadratic, thus D = 2. We use published models ([10, 14]) and
instantiate the costs as in Figure 6.7. We can see that, for the amortized cost and the
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Zaatar Pinocchio Our Algma
V’s Cost (Non-
amortized)
1.10h 9.9ms 1281s+ 7.70s
V’s Cost (Amor-
tized )
96.76h 164.3h 0.29s+ 696.67s
Task Computing 160s 160s 160s
P: Construct
proof
111.34h 445.56h 38.6ms+ 381s
P: Issue re-
sponses
124.38h N/A 158.8s+ 895.5s
Map: 0.9ms Exp: 118.3µs, fixed
base, optimized for
twist curve
Div: 3µs , 220-bit Mult: 320ns, 220-bit
Rand: 260ns, 220-bit Muex: 401.0µs, 254-
bit, optimized for twist
curve
Oper:130µs, 220-bit
ρ: 8 ρlin: 20
Dec: 170µs , 220 bits Enc: 88µs , 220 bits
aNote: we list the cost for both the first layer and the second layer in our design, connected by “+”.
Figure 6.7 An Loop Example and Its Cost
prover’s cost, our protocol is far superior to the other two. This also implies that in our
protocol smaller breakeven batching size suffices to guarantee that the average cost for
verification per instance is less than re-computing.
6.4.3 Further Discussion
If we examine our protocol carefully, a natural question will arise: why cannot the
block be of size K0 ·C such that K0 6= 1? Moreover, if we group K0 successive executions
of the loop body into large blocks (K0 < K), then we can further group several sequential
big blocks into a bigger block. The whole circuit can be viewed as a multiple-layer
structure. More specifically, we can view the whole circuit as one big block, which
we call the first layer block and denote by a function ψ(1) : FM+K·Q 7→ FM . In the
second layer’s perspective, the circuit consists of K0 smaller blocks, which we call the
second layer block and denote by a function ψ(2) : FM+K·Q/K0 7→ FM . In each layer,
several blocks constitute the circuit. The block in the l-th layer is denoted by a function
ψ(l) : FM+K·Q/(Kl−10 ) 7→ FM . The l-th layer block is composed of K0 lower layer blocks,
i.e. the l+1 layer blocks. At the L-th layer, the last layer, each of the blocks is equivalent
to one execution of the loop body. Note that the reduction of our verification can go
further recursively in this multiple-layer view. According to our current protocol, the
correctness of computing ψ(1) is reduced to the correctness of computing ψ(2). Similarly,
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the correctness of computing ψ(2) is reduced to the correctness of computing ψ(3). We
can keep doing this until we meet the last layer. At a first glance, this recursive protocol
seems promising. However, it is the first layer that dominates the cost. This implies
that this method introduces high cost due to the recursion. More specifically, if we have
multiple-layer blocks, then from ψ(1)(·) = ψ(2)(ψ(2)(· · · (ψ(2)(·)) · · · )), we see the degree
of the polynomial a block computes increases exponentially. Simple analysis will show
that the cost of the first layer dominates and therefore the cost for this recursive method
is proportional to O(DK), which is much more than our current protocol. Recall in our
current protocol, the block is one execution of the loop body. Thus, the degree of the
polynomial this block computes is D. This is also the reason why sequential circuits –
where the output of each gate is an input to the next gate – is the worst-case scenario
for our protocol. Such circuits are better tackled with Zaatar, Pinocchio, etc.
6.5 Mathematical Proofs
6.5.1 Complete Proof of Theorem 17
Proof. In Section 6.2, We have constructed a group of interpolation polynomials in La-
grange form. Now, we prove that the constructed polynomials are indeed the BP that
computes Ψ.
(1) (=⇒)
Suppose (z1, z2, · · · , zN+N ′) ∈ FN+N ′ is a valid assignment of Ψ’s inputs and outputs.
Then, there exist intermediate results zN+N ′+1, · · · , zW , which are all the outputs from
each block except those which are also outputs of the whole circuit. Thus, according to
(6.2.1), we can generate Pj(t) for j = 1, 2, · · · ,M using these zw (w = 1, 2, · · · = W ) and
the BP we have constructed above.
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Now we look at Pj(σk) where k = 1, 2, · · · , K.
Pj(σk) =ψj
(
W∑
w=1
zw · A1w(σk), · · · ,
W∑
w=1
zw · AV w(σk)
)
−
(
W∑
w=1
zw ·Bjw(σk)
)
. (6.5.1)
We have constructed Avw(t) and Bjw(t) for v = 1, 2, · · · , V , j = 1, 2, · · · ,M and
k = 1, 2, · · · , K. Recall that in our construction, we let Avw(σk) = 1 if zw is the v-th
input to the k-th block, and Avw(σk) = 0 otherwise; we also let Bjw(σk) = 1 if zw is the
j-th output from the k-th block, and Bjw(σk) = 0 otherwise. Then, if zw†i
is the v-th
input to the k-th block, and zw∗j is the j-th output from the k-th block, we will have:
Pj(σk) =ψj
(
zw†1
, zw†2
, · · · , zw†V
)
−
(
zw∗j
)
. (6.5.2)
(In the example of the circuit in Figure 6.1, if j = 2 and k = 3, then zw†1
is z11, zw†2
is z12, zw†3
is z13, and zw∗2 is z8.)
From the k-th block’s functionality, we know that
ψj
(
zw†1
, zw†2
, · · · , zw†V
)
−
(
zw∗j
)
= 0 (6.5.3)
Thus, for all σk, where k = 1, 2, · · · , K (recall K is the number of blocks in the
circuit), and for j = 1, 2, · · · ,M , we have Pj(σk) = 0. Namely, σk, where k = 1, 2, · · · , K,
are the roots of the polynomials Pj(t), where j = 1, 2, · · · ,M . If we recall the expression
of the target polynomial D(t) =
∏K
k=1(t − σk), it is straightforward that σk, where
k = 1, 2, · · · , K, are the roots of D(t). Given that σk, where k = 1, 2, · · · , K, are
different from each other, we can conclude that D(t) divides Pj(t), for j = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
(2) (⇐=)
Suppose for (z1, z2, · · · , zN+N ′) ∈ FN+N ′ , there exist coefficients zN+N ′+1, · · · , zW such
that D(t) divides Pj(t), (j = 1, 2, · · · ,M), where Pj(t) is defined as in (6.2.1).
Then, each of D(t)’roots is also a root of Pj(t) for j = 1, 2, · · · ,M . Namely, σk, where
k = 1, 2, · · · , K, are also the roots of the polynomials Pj(t), where j = 1, 2, · · · ,M . Thus,
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for k = 1, 2, · · · , K and j = 1, 2, · · · ,M we have:
Pj(σk) = 0 (6.5.4)
This can be represented as
0 =ψj
(
W∑
w=1
zw · A1w(σk), · · · ,
W∑
w=1
zw · AV w(σk)
)
−
(
W∑
w=1
zw ·Bjw(σk)
)
(6.5.5)
Now, we assign (z1, z2, · · · , zN+N ′) to the input/output wires of the circuit. We also
assign zN+N ′+1, · · · , zW to the corresponding output wires of all the blocks.
Recall that in our construction, we let Avw(σk) = 1 if zw is the v-th input to the k-th
block, and Avw(σk) = 0 otherwise; we also let Bjw(σk) = 1 if zw is the j-th output from
the k-th block, and Bjw(σk) = 0 otherwise. Then, if zw†v is the v-th input to the k-th
block, and zw∗j is the j-th output from the k-th block, we can simplify (6.5.5) as follows:
ψj
(
zw†1
, zw†2
, · · · , zw†V
)
−
(
zw∗j
)
= 0 (6.5.6)
This implies that zw†i
where i = 1, 2, · · · ,M and zw∗j where j = 1, 2, · · · ,M is a valid
assignment of the k-th block’s inputs and outputs.
Similarly, for all k = 1, 2, · · · , K, our assignment covers valid inputs and outputs of
the corresponding block. Namely, (z1, z2, · · · , zN+N ′) is a valid assignment of the circuit’s
inputs and outputs.
From (1) and (2), we know that the constructed polynomials are indeed the BPs that
compute Ψ.
6.5.2 Proof of Soundness
To better illustrate the logical flow of the soundness proof, we first provide the fol-
lowing simple experiment. Suppose P must choose between two boxes (the left and the
right box), each containing a number of white balls and black balls. The right box stands
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for the correct proof, while the left box for the wrong proof. White balls represent tests
that pass, black balls represent tests that fail. By the completeness argument, we know
that all the balls in the right box are white. On the other hand, the left box contains
both white and black balls. The prover P chooses one of the boxes, and places it in a
dark room (the room stands for the prover’s commitment). The verifier V has to test the
box, to see whether the prover chose the wrong proof. To accomplish this, V enters the
dark room and picks a ball from the box. Then V exits the room and looks at the ball.
Our proof flows as follows. 1. We first show that if V were to randomly pick a ball from
the left box, then Pr{the ball is white} < κM0 , where κM0 is some small positive constant
(that is, the left box contains mostly black balls). 2. We then reason that, if for the box
in the dark room we have Pr{the ball is white} > κM0 , then the box has to be the right
box.
Our soundness proof is a bit less straightforward. To make it work, we have to first
condition our probabilities on the event that all proofs provided by the prover are linear.
In Lemma 22, we show that, if the verifier provides the wrong result (and consequently the
wrong proof), then Pr{V accepts |all purported proofs are linear } < κM0 . Now looking
back to Theorem 20, to prove the soundness it suffices to show the existence of κ. We start
our proof by providing an explicit value κ∗. It now suffices to prove that, if the probability
that the verifier accepts (not conditioned on anything) is greater than κ∗, then the
purported results are correct. So we show that, if the probability that the verifier accepts
is greater than κ∗, then we have Pr{V accepts |all purported proofs are linear} > κM0 ,
Finally, we bootstrap our argument as above, reasoning that unless the results of the
computation are correct, a contradiction ensues with Lemma 22.
Let us proceed. For simplicity, we extract a part of purely mathematical transforma-
tion from our proof into Lemma 21.
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Lemma 21. In the context of loop circuits (as in Figure 6.3),
D(τ) ·Hj(τ) = ψ(2)j
( K∑
k=2
Z1,k · Ak(τ) + IN(1)1 · A1(τ), · · · ,
K∑
k=2
ZM,k · Ak(τ) + IN(1)M · A1(τ),
K∑
k=1
EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+1 · Ak(τ),
· · · ,
K∑
k=1
EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+Q · Ak(τ)
)
−
(K−1∑
k=1
Zj,k+1 · Ak(t)
+ AK(τ) · OUT(1)j
)
(6.5.7)
is equivalent to OUT
(2)
j = ψ
(2)
j (IN
(2)
1 , · · · , IN(2)M , EX(2)1 , · · · , EX(2)Q ), for inputs IN(1)1 , · · · , IN(1)M ,
extra inputs EX
(1)
1 , · · · , EX(1)Q·K, and outputs OUT(1)1 , · · · , OUT(1)M , and IN(2)1 , · · · , IN(2)M , EX(2)1 , · · · , EX(2)Q ,
OUT
(2)
1 , · · · , OUT(2)M are defined in terms of τ as in Figure 6.5.
A simple change of variable suffices to prove it.
Lemma 22. Let V and P run our protocol as in Figure 6.5. If the results of the com-
putation task are not correct, for the cases that all purported proofs piGj (j = 1, · · · ,M),
piINi (i = 1, · · · ,M), piHj (j = 1, · · · ,M) are linear functions, we have:
Pr{V accepts |all purported proofs are linear} < κM0 , (6.5.8)
where κ0 =
K·D
|F| or κZaatar, D is the degree of the polynomial that computes the loop
body and K is the number of executions of the loop body. The probability is over the
randomness of both V and P in both phases our protocol.
Proof. Under the condition that all purported proofs piGj (j = 1, · · · ,M), piINi (i =
1, · · · ,M), piHj (j = 1, · · · ,M) are linear functions, all the linearity tests pass. Then, V
accepts if
OUT
(2)
j = ψ
(2)
j (IN
(2)
1 , · · · , IN(2)M , EX(2)1 , · · · , EX(2)Q ). (6.5.9)
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This is checked by computing himself or using existing protocols, like Zaatar or Pinocchio.
If he computes himself, by Lemma 21, the verifier accepts only when the following holds:
D(τ) ·Hj(τ) = ψ(2)j
( K∑
k=2
Z1,k · Ak(τ) + IN(1)1 · A1(τ), · · · ,
K∑
k=2
ZM,k · Ak(τ) + IN(1)M · A1(τ),
K∑
k=1
EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+1 · Ak(τ), · · · ,
K∑
k=1
EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+Q · Ak(τ)
)
−[
K−1∑
k=1
Zj,k+1 · Ak(τ) + AK(τ) · OUT(1)j ]. (6.5.10)
This is a simple test of the following at the point t = τ :
D(t) ·Hj(t) = ψ(2)j
( K∑
k=2
Z1,k · Ak(t) + IN(1)1 · A1(t), · · · ,
K∑
k=2
ZM,k · Ak(t) + IN(1)M · A1(t),
K∑
k=1
EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+1 · Ak(t), · · · ,
K∑
k=1
EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+Q · Ak(t)
)
−[
K−1∑
k=1
Zj,k+1 · Ak(t) + AK(t) · OUT(1)j ]. (6.5.11)
However, since the results are not correct, by Corollary 18, for any j = 1, 2, · · · ,M ,
there is no Hj(t) for which (6.5.11) holds. Thus, V wrongly accepts only if τ is a root of
(6.5.11). By Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the probability that V wrongly accepts is bounded
above by K·D|F| , where D is the degree of the polynomial that computes the loop body
and K is the number of executions of the loop body. If V uses Zaatar to check (6.5.9),
then the probability is bounded above by κZaatar (refer to [10], Apdx. A.2). Notice the
divisibility tests will run M times. Thus, if the results of the computation are not correct,
then, Pr{V accepts| all purported proofs are linear } < κM0 , where κ0 = K·D|F | or κZaatar.
The probability is over the randomness of V and P in both phases our protocol.
The proof of Theorem 20 is as follows (our articulation follows [10]):
Proof. We address the general cases where maybe not all purported proofs piGj (j =
1, · · · ,M), piINi (i = 1, · · · ,M), piHj (j = 1, · · · ,M) are linear functions. We define
κ∗ = max{(1− 3δ+ 6δ2)ρlin , 6Mδ+κM0 } (where ρlin is the number of linearity tests, and
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0 < δ < δ∗, δ∗ is the lesser root of 6δ2 − 3δ + 2/9 = 0), and claim this κ∗ is the κ we are
looking for. Now, we prove our claim. It suffices to prove: if Pr{V accepts} > κ∗, then
the purported results are correct. (This statement is equivalent to the requirement for
κ.) The probability is over the randomness of both V and P in both phases our protocol.
Pr{V accepts} > κ∗ implies that both linearity tests and the divisibility tests pass
with probability greater than κ∗. Then, we know the linearity tests pass with probability
greater than (1 − 3δ + 6δ2)ρlin . If the linearity tests pass with probability greater than
(1− 3δ + 6δ2)ρlin , then the proof is δ-close to linear; this follows from results of Bellare
et al. [59, 65]; see the analysis in the extended version of [8], Apdx. A.2. Suppose
Pr{V accepts} > κ∗, then we also have Pr{V accepts} > 6Mδ + κM0 . If we exclude
the cases that any of the queries in the divisibility tests “hit” the non-linear part, the
remaining cases are those that all the queries in the divisibility tests “hit” the linear part
of the purported proofs. Let EH be the event that all the queries in the divisibility tests
“hit” the linear part of the purported proofs. Since one query in the divisibility tests “hit”
the non-linear part is δ, by union bound, Pr{EH} ≤ 6Mδ. Thus, Pr{V accepts, EH} <
Pr{EH} < 6Mδ. Since Pr{V accepts} = Pr{V accepts, EH}+Pr{V accepts, EH}, and
Pr{V accepts} > 6Mδ + κM0 , we can have Pr{V accepts, EH} > κM0 .
Then, we have Pr{V accepts|EH} > Pr{V accepts, EH} > κM0 . Since the effect of
testing the divisibility using all the queries that “hit” the linear part of the purported
proofs is exactly the same as testing the divisibility under the condition that all purported
proofs are linear, we will have :
Pr{V accepts|all purported proofs are linear} > κM0 (6.5.12)
(6.5.12) implies the purported results are correct. Otherwise, if the purported results are
not correct, by Lemma 22, we will have Pr{V accepts|all purported proofs are linear} <
κM0 , which contradicts (6.5.12).
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6.5.3 Proof of Completeness
The proof of Theorem 19 is as follows:
Proof. If P computes the result correctly, then he is able to construct the correct proofs:
piGj (j = 1, 2, · · · ,M), piINi (i = 1, 2, · · · ,M), piHj (j = 1, 2, · · · ,M). These proofs will
pass the linearity tests and the commitment tests.
Since the results are correct, by Corollary 18, there exist polynomials Hj(t) for j =
1, 2, · · · ,M such that
D(t) ·Hj(t)
=ψ
(2)
j
( K∑
k=2
Z1,k · Ak(t) + IN(1)1 · A1(t), · · · ,
K∑
k=2
ZM,k · Ak(t) + IN(1)M · A1(t),
K∑
k=1
EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+1 · Ak(t),
· · · ,
K∑
k=1
EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+Q · Ak(t)
)
−
(
K−1∑
k=1
Zj,k+1 · Ak(t) + AK(t) · OUT(1)j
)
. (6.5.13)
where IN
(1)
1 , · · · , IN(1)M and EX(1)1 , · · · , EX(1)Q·K are respectively the inputs are the extra inputs
to the loop circuit, and OUT
(1)
1 , · · · , OUT(1)M are the outputs from the loop circuit, as in
Figure 6.5. (6.5.13) holds for any τ ∈ F, namely
D(τ) ·Hj(τ)
=ψ
(2)
j
( K∑
k=2
Z1,k · Ak(τ) + IN(1)1 · A1(τ), · · · ,
K∑
k=2
ZM,k · Ak(τ) + IN(1)M · A1(τ),
K∑
k=1
EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+1 · Ak(τ),
· · · ,
K∑
k=1
EX
(1)
[(k−1)·Q]+Q · Ak(τ)
)
−
(
K−1∑
k=1
Zj,k+1 · Ak(τ) + AK(τ) · OUT(1)j
)
. (6.5.14)
By Lemma 21, following holds:
OUT
(2)
j = ψ
(2)
j (IN
(2)
1 , · · · , IN(2)M , EX(2)1 , · · · , EX(2)Q ) (6.5.15)
Then, P can always convince V (6.3.11) holds. Hence, Pr{V accepts} = 1.
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6.6 Cost Analysis
6.6.1 Amortized Cost Calculation
The amortized part includes:
1. constructing the BPs based on the “loop” circuit;
2. generating the commitment queries;
3. generating the linearity test queries;
4. generating the divisibility test queries.
5. generating the decommitment queries;
We will analyze these investments one by one.
For the first part, once the BPs are constructed, they can work over all instances of
the same “loop” circuit. Thus, it is a constant cost.
For the second part, V needs to generate the queries for the commitment phase of
the commit/decommit protocol, and send these to P . These queries are in the form of
a vector Enc(r) where r is V ’s secret. V only needs to generate one commitment query
for all layers and all instances. This query has length equal to the length of the longest
linear proof. Recall that the longest linear proof is piHj(t) whose length is K · D − K,
where K is the number of executions of the loop body, D is the degree of the polynomial
that the loop body computes. Thus, the cost of generating the commitment query is
[K ·D−K]·Enc where Enc is the cost of one encryption over the finite field F. Similarly, if
we generate the commitment query for piG, and piIN , we will introduce extra cost K ·Enc.
For the third part, V generates the queries for checking the linearity of each proofs.
(Recall that in one linearity test, V sends out queries q1, q2 and q1 + q2 and expects P
to return answers pi(q1), pi(q2) and pi(q1 + q2) such that pi(q1) + pi(q2) = pi(q1 + q2).)
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Suppose for each proof, V needs to perform ρlin linearity tests per iteration of the
verification. (One verification instance we run ρ iteration.) Then, V needs to randomly
generate 2ρlin queries and perform ρlin times vector addition. As in Zaatar [10], we omit
the addition part. We use only one set of queries to check the linearity of all proofs. The
cost is 2ρlin · Rand · [K ·D−K] where Rand is the cost of randomly generating a number
over the finite field F. Similarly, if we generate the linearity test queries for piG, and piIN ,
we introduce extra cost 2ρlin · Rand ·K.
For the fourth part, V needs to generate the queries qH , qG, and qIN . In every
layer’s verification, V does not need to send all these queries to P . Instead, he can
just send τ to P and P calculates these queries himself. The reason why V needs
to construct the queries qH , qG, qIN , is that he needs to construct the decommitment
queries based on these queries. We use the same qH for all piHj , the same qG for all piGj
(where j = 1, 2, · · · ,M), the same qIN for all piINi (where i = 1, 2, · · · ,M). The cost of
generating qH is [K ·D−K] ·Mult, where Mult is the cost of multiplication over the field
F. To generate qG, and qIN , it suffices to generate (A1(τ), A2(τ), · · · , AK(τ)). The cost
of generating (A1(τ), A2(τ), · · · , AK(τ)) is (Div + 4Mult) · K, according to [10], where
Div is the cost of division over the field F.
For the fifth part, in the decommitment phase of the commit/decommit protocol,
V sends P an auxiliary query which is the weighted sum of the set of PCP queries
(including the divisibility queries and the linearity test queries) and the commitment
query. Remember that for one verification instance we run ρ iterations, thus, the cost is
ρ · [2ρlin(K ·D −K) · Mult + 2ρlin ·K · Mult
+(K ·D −K) · Mult +K · Mult]. (6.6.1)
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Now, we omit the cost of constructing BPs. Since for one verification instance we
run ρ iterations, the total amortized cost is the sum of the cost from 2) to 5):
Ca =[K ·D −K] · Enc +K · Enc
+ρ · [2ρlin · Rand · (K ·D −K) + 2ρlin · Rand ·K]
+ρ · [(K ·D −K) · Mult + (Div + 4Mult) ·K]
+ρ · [2ρlin · (K ·D −K) · Mult + 2ρlin ·K · Mult
+(K ·D −K) · Mult +K · Mult]. (6.6.2)
We simplify the above into:
Ca =(K ·D) · [Enc + 2ρ · ρlin · (Rand + Mult) + 2ρ · Mult]
+ρ · (Div + 3 · Mult) ·K (6.6.3)
6.6.2 Non-amortized Cost
The non-amortized cost consists of two parts: one is the cost in each layer, including
the check and the updating; the other is the decommitment test.
Firstly, to check
OUT
(2)
j = D(τ) · piHj(qH) + piGj(qG) + AK(τ) · OUT(1)j ,
V needs to perform 2M multiplications. Secondly, to update INi, V needs to perform
another M multiplications. Thirdly, V needs to generate EXu’s. Since the extra inputs
are changing for every computation instance, this part can not be amortized. This
cost is Q · K · Mult. Lastly, in the final decommitment test, V needs to perform the
decommitment test for 3M proofs: qHj , qINi and qGj where i, j = 1, 2, · · · ,M . For
each decommitment test, V needs to perform one decryption, one multiplication for the
divisibility test query, one multiplication for each of the linearity test queries. This
implies a cost of 3M · (Dec + Mult(1 + 3ρlin)), where Dec is the cost for one decryption
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operation over field F. Since for one verification instance we run ρ iterations, the total
non-amortized cost is
3M · Dec + ρ(6M +Q ·K + 9Mρlin) · Mult. (6.6.4)
6.6.3 Prover’s Cost
The method to construct the proof vector is the same as that in Zaatar. However, in
our design, the proof length is reduced from K ·C to K ·D. This implies the corresponding
costs in Figure 6.6.
6.7 Conclusions
This chapter addresses two fundamental problems in the verifiable computation: 1)
whether and what computations can have lower amortized cost and proof generation
cost; 2) how to handle loops concisely in verifiable computing. We give a first-step
answer by showing that for computation with loops, we can use Block Programs, our
new theoretical result, to reduce the verifier’s amortized cost to the sum of two parts,
one of which is merely verification of one execution of the loop body (which does not
scale with the number of loop repetitions) and the other is linear in the degree of the
loop body and the number of executions of the loop body. From the theory of arithmetic
circuit complexity, the degree of most circuits will be far less than their size. Hence
the verifier’s amortized costs in our design is far less than the counterpart of existing
algorithms, which are linear in the size of the whole circuit. We also improve the prover’s
cost of proof generation from quasilinear in the size of the loop body (like in Zaatar) to
quasilinear in the degree of the loop body, attached with a cost of generating a proof for
one single execution of the loop body, achieving great savings similarly.
For applications that require a large number of loop executions (which is common in
not only compute-intensive computations but also data-intensive computations such as
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big data applications), and have loop bodies the degree of which is far less than their
size (from the theory of arithmetic circuit complexity, this is nature: the degree of most
circuits will be far less than their size), our approach is expected to perform better than
existing verifiable computation protocols. However, for “deep” loop bodies, in which the
output of each gate is an input to the next gate, standard algorithms like Zaatar and
Pinocchio would probably do better.
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CHAPTER 7. FUTURE WORK: DISTRIBUTED
VERIFIABLE COMPUTATION WITH VERIFICATION
OUTSOURCING
7.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
Cloud computing is bound to become the leading trend of modern computing. Its
potential client base is extremely diverse, ranging from small businesses, trying to cut
down on their computation and storage costs, to private users trying to run computation-
intensive applications on their lightweight, hand-held devices, and to the military, trying
to opportunistically employ both trusted and untrustworthy computational resources
for quick information processing, leading to responsible decision making. In the del-
egation of computation (or computation outsourcing) paradigm, the client delegates a
computational task to the server. The client provides the server with the input of the
computational task. The server produces a result, and returns it to the client. Should
the client require result assurance, he can start a standard verification protocol, where
the server and the client assume the roles of the prover and the verifier, respectively.
The problem of delegation of computation or verifiable computation has been intensely
investigated, and almost-practical verification algorithms have been recently proposed
not only in this dissertation but also in existing work. Moreover, the idea of verification
outsourcing, first introduced in this dissertation, is bound to additionally decrease the
computational costs of the client, by outsourcing verification to a third party. Of course,
new soundness and confidentiality issues arise in this context.
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Figure 7.1 A basic scenario of distributed delegation of verification with distributed
delegation of verification.
Yet another, more challenging application of cloud computing emerges in distributed
environments, and is the focus of the current research project. While civilian applications
abound, for demonstration purposes we like to refer to a more security-sensitive example,
like the one presented by a combat environment.
Imagine a soldier squad, or a squadron of aircraft deployed in the field, acquiring,
sharing and processing information to support decision making. Since information and
(as a consequence) computational loads may easily become overwhelming (especially for
a single one of the lightweight devices carried by infantry troops), the need for distributed
delegation of computation becomes apparent. In this scenario, the squad (or squadron)
leader plays the role of the client, while all other available computation resources play
the role of the server. The available computation resources include, but are not limited
to, the computing devices carried by the squad (or squadron) members. However, in
addition to these, the local infrastructure may be used to help the computation. This
approach immediately implies a need for confidentiality. Moreover, since all protocols
are negotiated over a wireless medium, the confidentiality constraints on the delegation
of computation would also protect against undetected intrusion by malicious devices.
A basic scenario is depicted in Figure 7.1, where squad members, the local infras-
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tructure, and enemy soldiers are all part of two protocols: delegation of computation,
and delegation of verification. The local infrastructure may prove to be a computational
asset, but may not be trusted with sensitive information, while the enemy soldier will
probably attempt to interfere with the correctness of the protocol, or intelligently influ-
ence the protocol in a way that leads to maximum information leakage. Consequently
security mechanisms have to be implemented, to restrict the amount of information that
leaks to the delegates about: (a) the details of the computational task, (b) the input of
the computational task and (c) the result of the computational task. In addition, since
verification is also outsourced in a distributed manner, an additional layer of security
mechanisms should ensure that the verification protocol maintains its soundness, even
in the presence of colluding cheating or lazy verifiers.
7.2 Methods and the Key Contribution
In the future work, we aim to combine the distributed delegation of computation
with confidentiality constraints, and the distributed delegation of verification, such that
the set of provers coincides with the set of verifiers. In fact this new framework implies
only two types of actors: the client C and the multiple prover/verifiers P/V (as in Figure
7.2). We aim at keeping the computation and/or the inputs/outputs (at least partially)
confidential from the prover/verifiers. Intelligent mixing and scheduling of the delegation
and verification tasks is required to maintain the soundness of the protocol. Intelligent
mixing and scheduling would decrease the correlation between the computation and
verification tasks at each prover/verifier. This would reduce the prover/verifier’s ability
to cheat during the computation and verification processes, while ensuring that the
prover/verifier cannot recover too much information about the computation task, its
inputs and its outputs. In essence, each computation/verification assignment is masked
by other computation/verification assignments.
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Figure 7.2 Delegation of computation with delegation of verification in a simple star
topology.
The challenge is to ensure that such exposure, which is beyond the control of the
client, does not compromise the confidentiality and soundness of the protocol. Informa-
tion leakage may prove to be inevitable under particular network conditions. For these
cases, we design a mechanism that can easily detect and isolate the point where such
information leakage occurs. The following cases shall be considered under this topology:
(1) the client has the full knowledge of the topology of the network of all verifiers/provers;
(2) the client has partial or no knowledge of the topology.
The first case requires a deeper understanding of the network topology. We shall
decompose the network according to graph theory and find out critical nodes along the
verification/computation chain. Critical nodes are those that are exposed to the most
information about the computational task and its inputs/outputs. Special algorithms
will be required when interacting with the critical nodes. For the second case, a tradeoff
between security constraints and efficiency will be provided.
To summarize, the novelty of our future work can be stated as follows:
1. We propose to augment the distributed-delegation-of-computation paradigm with
distributed delegation of verification. While the confidentiality aspect of delegated
verification can be solved by an extension of the results of verification outsourc-
ing, we will introduce more efficient algorithms, that rely on intelligently mixing
the computation results and verification tasks during the verification-delegation
process.
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2. We will demonstrate, for the first time, that in a distributed environment, the same
computational resources used for performing the delegated computation can also
be used for performing the verification, in a secure and sound manner. We will
focus on a randomly-connected topology with multiple, collaborating delegation
and aggregation nodes.
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